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Hicks v. Dowd,
CONSERVATION EASEMENTS,
AND THE CHARITABLE TRUST DOCTRINE:
SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT
Nancy A. McLaughlin*
W. William Weeks**
This is the fourth in an exchange of articles published by the Wyoming Law
Review discussing the application of charitable trust principles to conservation
easements conveyed as charitable gifts. In 2002, Johnson County, Wyoming,
attempted to terminate a conservation easement that had been conveyed to the
County as a tax-deductible charitable gift.1 The County’s actions were challenged,
* Nancy A. McLaughlin (J.D., University of Virginia) is the Robert W. Swenson Professor
of Law and Associate Dean for Faculty Research and Development at the University of Utah S.J.
Quinney College of Law. Professor McLaughlin has authored many articles addressing conservation
easements, tax law, and nonproﬁt governance issues (available in PDF format on her faculty
webpage at http://www.law.utah.edu), and she speaks frequently on these issues in both academic
and nonacademic settings. Professor McLaughlin is a member of the American Law Institute, a
fellow of the American College of Trust and Estate Counsel, and serves as an Observer with regard
to the Regulation of Charities project of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws (NCCUSL). She served as a member of the Land Trust Alliance’s Conservation Easement
Amendment Policy Group, which assisted with the drafting of the Alliance’s report on conservation
easement amendments, and she is a member of the Alliance’s Conservation Defense Advisory
Council. She also serves on the advisory boards of Utah Open Lands and Vital Ground, and is a
member of the Habitat Protection Advisory Committee of the Wildlife Land Trust.
** W. William Weeks (J.D., Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington) is President of
the Conservation Law Center; Director of Indiana University School of Law’s Conservation Law
Clinic; former Vice President, Chief Operating Ofﬁcer, and Executive Vice President of The Nature
Conservancy; and author of BEYOND THE ARK (Island Press, 1996). He is also a member of the Board
of Directors of the Sycamore Land Trust.
1

See Quitclaim Deed between the Board of County Commissioners of Johnson County,
Wyoming, Grantor, and Fred L. Dowd and Linda S. Dowd, Grantee (Aug. 6, 2002), in which
the County attempted to transfer the conservation easement to the Dowds for the purpose of
terminating the easement. The Dowds had earlier purchased the land subject to the easement from
the easement donor. See Warranty Deed between the Lowham Limited Partnership, Grantor, and
Fred L. Dowd and Linda S. Dowd, Grantees (Feb. 1, 1999).
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ﬁrst in a suit brought by a resident of the County, Hicks v. Dowd, and then in a
suit brought by the Wyoming Attorney General, Salzburg v. Dowd.2 The over six
years of litigation associated with the easement’s attempted termination has been
the catalyst and background for the exchange of articles.
C. Timothy Lindstrom published the ﬁrst article, entitled Hicks v. Dowd:
The End of Perpetuity (The End of Perpetuity).3 The authors of the present article
published the second, entitled In Defense of Conservation Easements: A Response to
“The End of Perpetuity” (In Defense of Conservation Easements).4 Mr. Lindstrom
then responded with a “surrebuttal” entitled Conservation Easements, Common
Sense and the Charitable Trust Doctrine (the Surrebuttal).5
In his Surrebuttal, Mr. Lindstrom reiterates his assertion that land trusts are
free to modify and terminate the conservation easements they acquire as charitable
gifts, subject only to whatever constraints may be imposed by federal tax law and
any internal policies and procedures the land trusts might voluntarily adopt from
time to time.6 In other words, he would eliminate the right of state attorneys
2
In Hicks v. Dowd, 157 P.3d 914 (Wyo. 2007), a resident of Johnson County (Hicks) ﬁled
suit alleging, inter alia, that the conservation easement was held in trust for the beneﬁt of the public
and the County could not terminate the easement without receiving court approval in a cy pres
proceeding. On May 9, 2007, the Wyoming Supreme Court dismissed the case on the ground
that Hicks did not have standing to sue to enforce a charitable trust, but the Court invited the
Wyoming Attorney General, as supervisor of charitable trusts in the state of Wyoming, “to reassess
his position” with regard to the case. Hicks, 157 P.3d at 921. In July of 2008, the Wyoming Attorney
General ﬁled a complaint in District Court similarly arguing that the County had breached its
ﬁduciary duties in attempting to terminate the easement and requesting that the deed transferring
the easement to the Dowds be declared null and void. See Complaint for Declaratory Judgment
Charitable Trust, Mandamus Relief, Breach of Fiduciary Duties, Violation of Constitutional
Provisions at 13, Salzburg v. Dowd, Civ. No. CV-2008-0079 (July 8, 2008). Salzburg v. Dowd was
still pending at the time of the publication of this article.

C. Timothy Lindstrom, Hicks v. Dowd: The End of Perpetuity?, 8 WYO. L. REV. 25 (2008)
[hereinafter The End of Perpetuity]. The ﬁrst article discussing the case was published two years
earlier in the Wyoming bar journal. See Nancy A. McLaughlin, Could Coalbed Methane be the Death
of Conservation Easements?, 29 WYO. LAW. 18 (2006).
3

4
Nancy A. McLaughlin & W. William Weeks, In Defense of Conservation Easements: A
Response to The End of Perpetuity, 9 WYO. L. REV. 1 (2009) [hereinafter In Defense of Conservation
Easements].
5
C. Timothy Lindstrom, Conservation Easements, Common Sense and the Charitable Trust
Doctrine, 9 WYO. L. REV. 397 (2009) [hereinafter Surrebuttal].
6
The Surrebuttal complains of the “dismissive manner” in which In Defense of Conservation
Easements purportedly deals with the “constraints on land trusts imposed by existing law,” which,
according to The End of Perpetuity, are limited to the common law of real property and federal tax
law. See Surrebuttal, supra note 5, at 399; The End of Perpetuity, supra note 3, at 67. However, as
explained in In Defense of Conservation Easements, under the common law of real property, the owner
of an easement can unilaterally release the easement, in whole or in part, or agree with the owner
of the burdened land to modify or terminate the easement. Accordingly, such law does not appear
to place any meaningful constraint on a holder’s decision to modify or terminate a conservation
easement. See In Defense of Conservation Easements, supra note 4, at 4 n.4. In Defense of Conservation
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general and state courts to call land trusts (and, by extension, government entities)
to account for breaches of their ﬁduciary duties to conservation easement donors
and the public.
In advocating that the states should be deprived of their ability to call easement
holders to account for breaches of their ﬁduciary duties, the Surrebuttal reiterates
many of the same arguments originally made in The End of Perpetuity. Although
those arguments were refuted in In Defense of Conservation Easements, the authors
have nonetheless taken the time to respond to the Surrebuttal because of the
danger that it may mislead landowners, land trusts, public ofﬁcials, and others
regarding the laws that govern the actions of government entities and land trusts
that solicit and accept conservation easement and other charitable donations.7
Recognizing that readers may, by now, be a bit weary of this debate, the authors
address below only the most problematic of the Surrebuttal’s assertions. They also
have done so in an abbreviated fashion, referring readers, where appropriate, to
other sources for a more detailed exposition of the given points.

Technical “Trust” Characterization Not Required
The Surrebuttal argues that charitable trust principles should not apply
to conservation easements because “Wyoming law permits inference of intent
to create a trust, but the ‘. . . inference is not to come easily . . .’ and ‘. . .
clear, explicit, deﬁnite, unequivocal and unambiguous language or conduct
establishing the intent to create a trust is required . . . .’”8 That same argument
was made by the Dowds (the landowners arguing in favor of the termination
of the perpetual conservation easement) in Salzburg v. Dowd. 9 That argument

Easements also explains in great detail why federal tax law does not ensure that government entities
and charitable organizations comply with their ﬁduciary obligations to administer conservation
easements in accordance with their stated terms and purposes, and that state attorneys general and
state courts, rather than the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), are the proper enforcers of such state
law ﬁduciary obligations. See id. at 74–82. See also infra notes 95, 96 and accompanying text.
7
Although the Surrebuttal and The End of Perpetuity draw no distinction between
conservation easements donated as charitable gifts and those acquired by purchase, exaction, or in
other nondonative contexts, the analysis in this article (as in In Defense of Conservation Easements)
focuses on conservation easements conveyed to land trusts or state or local government entities
in whole or in part as charitable gifts—as was the case with the conservation easement at issue in
Salzburg v. Dowd and Hicks v. Dowd. See In Defense of Conservation Easements, supra note 4, at 4 n.5
(explaining that the fact that some conservation easements are not conveyed as charitable gifts is not
a justiﬁcation for permitting government or land trust holders to avoid their ﬁduciary obligations
with regard to those that are).
8

Surrebuttal, supra note 5, at 402 (citation omitted).

9

See Defendant Dowd’s Response to Motion for Summary Judgment at 7, Salzburg v.
Dowd, Civ. No. CV-2008-0079 (Sept. 4, 2009) [hereinafter Dowd’s Response].
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should be unavailing. The cases cited in the Surrebuttal and by the Dowds in
support of that argument do not involve charitable gifts. More importantly, it
should matter not whether the donation of a conservation easement creates a
technical “trust” under state law. As the Wyoming Attorney General explained in
his Memorandum in Support of his Motion for Summary Judgment in Salzburg
v. Dowd, in many jurisdictions charitable gifts made to government entities and
charitable organizations to be used for speciﬁc purposes are characterized as
“charitable trusts” even in the absence of the use of the words “trust” or “trustee”
in the instrument of conveyance.10 However, even in jurisdictions where such
gifts are not technically characterized as trusts, the substantive rules governing the
administration of charitable trusts nonetheless apply.11 All charitable gifts made
for speciﬁc purposes, regardless of whether they are technically characterized as
charitable trusts, are enforceable by the state attorney general (or other appropriate
public ofﬁcial).12 “The theory underlying the power of the attorney general to
enforce gifts for a stated purpose is that a donor who attaches conditions to his
gift has a right to have his intention enforced.”13 Wyoming law is in accord with
these authorities.14
Obsessive focus on whether the conveyance of a conservation easement
technically creates a charitable “trust” under state law obscures the fundamental
point. Conservation easements are donated as charitable gifts to government
entities or charitable organizations to be used for a speciﬁc charitable purpose—
the protection of the particular land encumbered by the easement for the
conservation purposes speciﬁed in the deed of conveyance.15 Accordingly,
donated conservation easements constitute restricted charitable gifts, and
whether technically characterized as charitable trusts under state law or not, the

10
See Plaintiff ’s Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 19–26,
Salzburg, Civ. No. CV-2008-0079 (Aug. 12, 2009) [hereinafter AG’s Motion for SJ]. See also 15
AM. JUR. 2D Charities § 8 (2009) (“A condition attached to a gift may be considered as tantamount
to imposing a trust, and if the condition involves application for charitable purposes, a charitable
trust will result.”).
11

See AG’s Motion for SJ, supra note 10, at 19–26. See also In Defense of Conservation
Easements, supra note 4, at 6–7.
12

See AG’s Motion for SJ, supra note 10, at 23–24.

13

Id. at 25–26 (citing Carl J. Herzog Found., Inc. v. Univ. of Bridgeport, 699 A.2d 995, 998
(Conn. 1997)).
14

Id. at 24–26.

15

The conservation easement at issue in Salzburg v. Dowd is a case in point, having been
donated to Johnson County, Wyoming, for the express purpose of “preserv[ing] and protect[ing] in
perpetuity the natural, agricultural, ecological, wildlife habitat, open space and aesthetic features and
values of [Meadowood] Ranch” for the beneﬁt of the public. See Deed of Conservation Easement
and Quitclaim Deed between the Lowham Limited Partnership, Grantor, and the Board of County
Commissioners of Johnson County, Wyoming, Grantee 1, 2 (Dec. 29, 1993) [hereinafter Lowham
Conservation Easement].
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substantive rules governing the administration of charitable trusts should apply.
This conclusion is supported by a variety of authoritative sources, including the
Uniform Conservation Easement Act, the Uniform Trust Code, the Restatement
(Third) of Property: Servitudes, and federal tax law.16 There is no authoritative
source of support for the contrary view.
Because the Wyoming Attorney General’s cogent exposition of the relevant
legal principles should be read by anyone interested in these issues, the portion of
his Memorandum in Support of his Motion for Summary Judgment discussing
the status of conservation easements as restricted charitable gifts or charitable
trusts is included as APPENDIX A to this Article.

Amendments
The Surrebuttal asserts that the application of charitable trust principles to
conservation easements means that
(1) no amendments should be agreed upon between landowner
and a holder of an easement without court approval under any
circumstances and (2) even with court approval, no amendments
should be approved unless compliance with easement terms
would “defeat or substantially impair” the purpose of the
easement, or unless the charitable purpose of the easement
becomes “impossible or impracticable.”17
Repetition of these alarming claims in the Surrebuttal does not make them any
more accurate or less misleading than when they were ﬁrst made in The End of
Perpetuity.18 The Surrebuttal does not respond to the detailed explanation of the
application of charitable trust principles to conservation easement amendments
in In Defense of Conservation Easements.19 Accordingly, we are compelled to point
out, again, that the law is much more reasonable and ﬂexible than The End
16
See UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT § 3 cmt. (2007), available at http://www.law.
upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucea/2007_ﬁnal.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 2009) [hereinafter UCEA]; UNIF.
TRUST CODE § 414 cmt. (2005), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/uta/2005ﬁnal.
htm (last visited Nov. 28, 2009) [hereinafter UTC]; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES
§ 7.11 (2000); I.R.C. § 170(h) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14 (2009). See generally In Defense
of Conservation Easements, supra note 4, for an extended discussion of these sources. For a more
abbreviated discussion of these sources, see Nancy A. McLaughlin, Conservation Easements:
Perpetuity and Beyond, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 673 (2007) [hereinafter Perpetuity and Beyond]. Wyoming
adopted the UTC in 2003. See WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 4-10-101 to -1103 (2009) [hereinafter
WYUTC]. Wyoming adopted the UCEA in 2005. See WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-1-201 to -207
(2009) [hereinafter WYUCEA].
17

Surrebuttal, supra note 5, at 407.

18

See The End of Perpetuity, supra note 3, at 62, 68–69, 78–79, 81.

19

See In Defense of Conservation Easements, supra note 4, at 41–56.
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of Perpetuity or the Surrebuttal would have the reader believe. Rather than set
forth a detailed exposition of the law in this article, the reader is encouraged to
return to Part II. D. of In Defense of Conservation Easements, where the subject of
amendments is discussed in detail. For purposes of this article, only the following
short summary of how charitable trust principles should apply to conservation
easement amendments is warranted.
1. If a land trust has negotiated for the inclusion of a standard
amendment provision in a conservation easement (as is
recommended by the Land Trust Alliance), the land trust has the
express power to simply agree with the owner of the encumbered
land to any and all amendments that are consistent with the
conservation purpose of the easement.20 Moreover, the land
trust’s exercise of this discretionary power will not be secondguessed by a court unless there has been a clear abuse.21
2. In the absence of an amendment provision, the land trust
may have the implied power to agree to amendments that are
consistent with the purpose of the easement, or the land trust
could seek court approval of such “consistent” amendments in
an administrative deviation proceeding, the legal standard for
which is more generous than the Surrebuttal asserts.22

20

See id. at 42–47. Such “consistent” amendments are the only type of amendments sanctioned
by the Land Trust Alliance and the Land Trust Accreditation Commission. For information on
the Land Trust Alliance, see http://www.landtrustalliance.org. For information on the Land Trust
Accreditation Commission, see http://www.landtrustaccreditation.org.
21

See In Defense of Conservation Easements, supra note 4 at 42–43.

22

See id. at 47–52. The Surrebuttal cites to an article published by Professor McLaughlin
in the Harvard Environmental Law Review in 2005, which states the common law standard for
the doctrine of administrative deviation (i.e., a court can authorize a deviation from the term of a
trust if compliance with the term would defeat or substantially impair the accomplishment of the
charitable purpose of the trust). Despite the seeming strictness of the common law standard, the
modern tendency has been to permit a trustee to deviate from an administrative term if continued
compliance with the term is deemed merely “undesirable,” “inappropriate,” or “inexpedient.” See,
e.g., In Defense of Conservation Easements, supra note 4, at 50. See also GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT
ET AL., THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 994 (3d ed. 2009) (“Where administrative provisions
handicap the trustee, or the trustee lacks an essential power, the court frequently releases the trustee
from the objectionable provision, or grants the needed authority, or otherwise changes the trust as
to methods of operation, so as to enable the trustee to achieve the primary purposes of the settlor.”).
The UTC, which was approved by NCCUSL in 2000 and has since been adopted in 22 states,
including Wyoming, relaxes the common law administrative deviation standard, basically codifying
the fact that courts tend to liberally apply the doctrine to allow deviations from the terms of a trust
where those deviations are consistent with or further the purpose of the trust. See UTC, supra note
16, § 412(b) (“The court may modify the administrative terms of a trust if continuation of the
trust on its existing terms would be impracticable or wasteful or impair the trust’s administration.”);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-413(b) (2009) (same).
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3. It is only when a land trust is seeking to terminate a conservation
easement, or “amend” it in a manner inconsistent with its
conservation purpose (such as to permit the subdivision and
development of the land, as was proposed in the Myrtle Grove
controversy), that court approval in a cy pres proceeding would
be necessary.23 In such a proceeding, it would have to be shown
that the charitable conservation purpose of the easement had
become “impossible or impractical,” and, if such a showing were
made, the holder would be entitled to a share of the proceeds
from a subsequent sale or development of the land, and the
holder would be required to use such proceeds to accomplish
similar charitable conservation purposes in some other manner
or location.
These requirements under charitable trust law are consistent with the
requirements under federal tax law for tax-deductible conservation easements.
Federal tax law requires, among other things, that (1) the conservation purpose
of a conservation easement must be “protected in perpetuity” (i.e., the easement
must not be transferable or amendable in a manner inconsistent with its
conservation purpose), and (2) the easement must be extinguishable (other than
through condemnation) only in a judicial proceeding, upon a ﬁnding that the
continued use of the land for conservation purposes has become “impossible or
impractical,” and with the payment of a share of the proceeds from the subsequent
sale or development of the land to the holder to be used for similar conservation
purposes (i.e., in a cy pres or similar equitable proceeding).24
Moreover, although no data exists on the prevalence of amendment provisions
in conservation easement deeds, their use is likely not “infrequent” as asserted in
23
See In Defense of Conservation Easements, supra note 4, at 52–53. The Myrtle Grove
controversy involved the attempted “amendment” of a conservation easement encumbering a
160-acre historic tobacco plantation on the Maryland Eastern Shore to permit a seven-lot upscale
subdivision on the property, complete with a single-family residence and ancillary structures, such
as a pool, pool house, and tennis courts, on each of the lots. The Maryland Attorney General ﬁled
suit, objecting to the amendment on charitable trust grounds. The case eventually settled, with the
easement remaining intact and the parties agreeing, inter alia, that (i) subdivision of the property
is prohibited; (ii) any action contrary to the express terms and stated purposes of the easement
is prohibited; and (iii) amending, releasing (in whole or in part), or extinguishing the easement
without the express written consent of the Maryland Attorney General is prohibited, except that
prior written approval of the attorney general is not required for approvals carried out pursuant to
the ordinary administration of the easement in accordance with its terms. See id. at 37–39.
24
See In Defense of Conservation Easements, supra note 4, at 78–79 (describing the requirements
under federal tax law for tax-deductible conservation easements). Federal tax law also requires,
among other things, that (1) the interest in the land retained by the conservation easement donor
must be subject to legally enforceable restrictions that will prevent any use of the land inconsistent
with the easement’s purpose, and (2) at the time of the donation, the possibility that the easement
will be defeated (by, for example, amendment, release, or termination) must be so remote as to be
negligible. See id.
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the Surrebuttal, at least not now.25 As explained in In Defense of Conservation
Easements, (1) the Conservation Easement Handbook has discussed the wisdom
of including an amendment provision in conservation easement deeds since its
ﬁrst publication in 1988, (2) the 2005 edition of the Handbook provides that
“[m]any easement drafters . . . consider it prudent to set the rules governing
amendments, both to provide the power to amend and to impose appropriate
limitations on that power to prevent abuses,” and “[a]mendment provisions are
becoming more common to assure and limit the Holder’s power to modify,”
and (3) in its recently published report on amendments, the Land Trust Alliance
strongly recommends that land trusts negotiate with easement grantors for the
desired level of amendment discretion and include an amendment provision in
easement deeds expressly granting them such discretion.26
Finally, the fact that some, typically older, conservation easements do not
contain amendment provisions is not a cause for specially exempting an entire
class of charities (land trusts) and an entire class of charitable gifts (conservation
easements) from oversight by state attorneys general and state courts.27 Rather,
to the extent they are not already doing so, land trusts should implement
best practices as recommended by the Land Trust Alliance and negotiate for
the amendment discretion they desire up front and in good faith at the time
of the acquisition of easements, and memorialize that grant of discretion in
the easement deeds. With regard to older conservation easements that do not
contain amendment provisions, it may be desirable to seek judicial or legislative
clariﬁcation of the extent of a holder’s implied power to agree to amendments that
are clearly consistent with or further the purpose of such easements.28 And where
the scope of a land trust’s implied power to amend is unclear or an amendment
would exceed its implied power, the land trust can seek judicial approval of the
amendment in a typically non-adversarial and ﬂexible administrative deviation
proceeding.
Land trusts can also work with state attorneys general to develop guidelines
regarding the proper procedures to be followed when amending conservation
easements. Land trusts in New Hampshire are doing just that. The ofﬁce of
the New Hampshire Attorney General, in conjunction with land trusts in New
Hampshire, is developing a comprehensive guide to amending conservation
25
See Surrebuttal, supra note 5, at 408 (asserting, without support, that amendment provisions
are “infrequently included”).
26

See In Defense of Conservation Easements, supra note 4, at 44–45.

27

If the Surrebuttal’s position were adopted, the hundreds of government entities holding
thousands of conservation easements across the nation would also be exempted from state oversight.
28

See In Defense of Conservation Easements, supra note 4, at 48 n.178 (discussing the Uniform
Management of Institutional Funds Act and the Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional
Funds Act). But see also id. at 87–94 (discussing the constitutional and other limits on the power of
state legislatures to alter the terms of existing or future charitable gifts).
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easements within the framework of the charitable trust doctrine.29 The Nature
Conservancy, which operates in all ﬁfty states, has similarly been working with
state attorneys general to develop policies regarding conservation easement
amendments.30 Accordingly, contrary to the assertion in the Surrebuttal, state
attorney general and court oversight of the activities of land trusts is not advocated
by “just academicians.”31 Rather, it is recognized by state attorneys general and
many in the land trust community as part of the common or statutory law of the
states.32

The Uniform Conservation Easement Act (UCEA)
The Surrebuttal’s argument of choice, the foundation upon which it stands, is
that conservation easements may be modiﬁed or terminated by simple agreement
of the parties thereto because the Wyoming Uniform Conservation Easement Act
(WYUCEA) states that conservation easements may be modiﬁed or terminated
“in the same manner as other easements.”33 This is surely an argument no lawyer
would fail to make if defending a client who improperly amended or terminated a
conservation easement.34 It might even appear to be reasonable to an audience not
experienced in reading the law. But those who have tried to understand and apply
statutory law know that it is far too easy to get it wrong if a line is taken from a
statute and read separately from the lines around it, insulated from the common
law that preceded and exists beside it, and bereft of the interpretive guidance
provided by the people who wrote it.
29
E-mail from Terry Knowles, past President of the National Association of State Charity
Ofﬁcials and Assistant Director of the Charitable Trusts Unit of the New Hampshire Attorney
General’s Ofﬁce, to Nancy A. McLaughlin (Dec. 21, 2009, 7:07am MST) (on ﬁle with authors).
30
The Nature Conservancy also ﬁled a Motion to Intervene in Salzburg v. Dowd in support
of the Wyoming Attorney General’s defense of the conservation easement at issue on charitable trust
grounds. See Motion of The Nature Conservancy to Intervene or Alternatively, Motion to Appear
as Amicus Curiae at 7, Salzburg, Civ. No. CV-2008-0079 (Aug. 7, 2009).
31

See Surrebuttal, supra note 5, at 412.

32

See In Defense of Conservation Easements, supra note 4, at 36–41 (explaining that the land
trust community has contemplated the application of charitable trust principles to conservation
easements for decades, and The End of Perpetuity’s (and, by extension, the Surrebuttal’s) characterization of the application of such principles to conservation easements as a new or unanticipated
control or burden is not supportable).
33
See Surrebuttal, supra note 5, at 401, 404–05. The actual provision of the WYUCEA reads
as follows: “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in [the act], a conservation easement may be created,
conveyed, recorded, assigned, released, modiﬁed, terminated or otherwise altered or affected in the
same manner as other easements.” WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34-1-202(a) (2009).
34
In fact, the Dowds, who argue that Johnson County’s termination of the conservation
easement at issue in Hicks v. Dowd and Salzburg v. Dowd was proper, make this very argument in
their pleadings and cite to the Surrebuttal for support. See Dowd’s Response, supra note 9, at 6–7.
Indeed, all those who seek to modify or terminate perpetual conservation easements for development
purposes and personal gain will no doubt cite to The End of Perpetuity and the Surrebuttal in support
of their position that conservation easements can be modiﬁed or terminated “in the same manner
as other easements.”
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To properly understand the UCEA, the reader should not hearken to the
Surrebuttal ’s invitation to ignore the UCEA drafter’s commentary or the state
legislatures’ intention in enacting the statute to achieve uniformity among the
states. The reader also should not accept the Surrebuttal ’s advice to ignore centuries
of common law intended to encourage charitable donations by defending the
intentions of charitable donors. And the reader should not disregard the clear
implication of the UCEA itself, which expressly provides that “[the act] shall not
affect the power of a court to modify or terminate a conservation easement in
accordance with the principles of law and equity.”35
The Surrebuttal attempts to dismiss the statutory language just noted, arguing
that such language “cannot be assumed to incorporate into Wyoming conservation
easements an entire body of law that directly contradicts the WYUCEA’s explicit
provision that conservation easements can be modiﬁed or terminated in the same
manner as other easements.”36 But the Surrebuttal’s reasoning is fundamentally
ﬂawed. As the drafters of the UCEA explained in their original comments, the
UCEA “leaves intact the existing case and statute law of adopting states as it
relates to the modiﬁcation and termination of easements and the enforcement
of charitable trusts” and “independently of the Act, the Attorney General could
have standing [to enforce a conservation easement] in his capacity as supervisor
of charitable trusts.”37 In other words, the UCEA does not, and was never
intended to abrogate the well-settled principles that apply when property, such as
a conservation easement, is conveyed as a charitable gift to be used for a speciﬁc
charitable purpose.38
To address any possible lingering confusion on this point, in 2007 the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved amendments to
35

UCEA, supra note 16, § 3(b); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34-1-203(b).

36

Surrebuttal, supra note 5, at 404 (emphasis omitted).

37

UCEA, supra note 16, § 3 cmt. (emphasis added).

38

In fact, if the drafters of the UCEA had intended to deny to landowners donating conservation
easements the protections afforded under state law to charitable donors of all other forms of property,
they surely would have done so explicitly. A basic principle of statutory construction is that repeals
by implication are strongly disfavored. See, e.g., Lewis v. Marriot Int’l, 527 F. Supp. 2d 422, 429
(E.D. Pa. 2007) (“As a matter of statutory construction, ‘statutes are not presumed to make changes
in the rules and principles of common law or prior existing law beyond what is expressly declared in
their provisions. . . .’ ‘[A]n implication alone cannot be interpreted as abrogating existing law. The
legislature must afﬁrmatively repeal existing law or speciﬁcally preempt accepted common law for
prior law to be disregarded.’”); Brown v. Mem’l Nat’l Home Found., 329 P.2d 118, 132–33 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1958) (“[I]t is not to be presumed that the legislature in the enactment of statutes intends
to overthrow long-established principles of law unless such intention is made clearly to appear either
by express declaration or by necessary implication.”); Boyd v. Commonwealth, 374 S.E.2d 301,
302 (Va. 1988) (“The common law will not be considered as altered or changed by statute unless
the legislative intent is plainly manifested. . . . When an enactment does not encompass the entire
subject covered by the common law, it abrogates the common-law rule only to the extent that its
terms are directly and irreconcilably opposed to the rule.”); In re Claim of Presad, 11 P.3d 344, 348
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the comments to the UCEA to conﬁrm its intention that conservation easements
be enforced as charitable trusts in appropriate circumstances, explaining that
while Section 2(a) [of the Act] provides that a conservation
easement may be modiﬁed or terminated “in the same manner
as other easements,” the governmental body or charitable
organization holding a conservation easement, in its capacity
as trustee, may be prohibited from agreeing to terminate the
easement (or modify it in contravention of its purpose) without
ﬁrst obtaining court approval in a cy pres proceeding.39
The decision of the UCEA drafters to “leave intact” the existing case and
statutory law as it applies to charitable trusts, and to decline to address such
law in the statute itself, was entirely sensible. As the drafters explained in their
commentary: (1) the UCEA has the relatively narrow purpose of sweeping away
certain impediments under the common law of real property that might otherwise
undermine the validity of conservation easements held in gross, and, thus, the
UCEA intentionally does not address a number of issues that were considered
extraneous to that objective, (2) researching the law relating to charitable trusts
and how such law would apply to conservation easements in each state was beyond
the scope of the drafting committee’s charge, and (3) the UCEA was intended to
be placed in the real property law of adopting states, and states generally would
not permit charitable trust law to be addressed in the real property provisions of
their state codes.40
Moreover, the UCEA validates conservation easements created in a variety
of contexts and containing a variety of terms. Thus, the UCEA validates
n.1 (Wyo. 2000) (‘‘‘Knowledge of the settled principles of statutory interpretation must be imputed
to the legislature.’ . . . This Court presumes that the legislature enacts statutes ‘with full knowledge
of the existing condition of the law and with reference to it. They are therefore to be construed in
connection and in harmony with the existing law, and as part of a general and uniform system of
jurisprudence . . . .’” (citations omitted)); McKinney v. McKinney, 135 P.2d 940, 942 (Wyo. 1943)
(“[I]t is well settled that in construing statutes the rules of the common law are not to be changed
by doubtful implication nor overturned except by clear and unambiguous language.”).
39

UCEA, supra note 16, § 3 cmt.

40

See UCEA, supra note 16, § 3 cmt. The Surrebuttal argues that this last statement, which is
included in the revised comments to the UCEA “itself acknowledges that the charitable trust doctrine
does not apply to easements currently.” Surrebuttal, supra note 5, at 401. That is a misreading of the
comments. It could not be more clear from the comments that the drafters of the UCEA intended
charitable trust principles, which were expressly left “intact,” to apply to conservation easements
in appropriate circumstances. Other issues the UCEA drafters expressly left to be addressed by an
adopting state’s “other applicable laws” are: (1) the formalities and effects of recordation, (2) the
potential impact of a state’s marketable title laws upon the duration of conservation easements,
(3) the effect of a conservation easement on the value of the burdened land for local property tax
purposes, and (4) the scope and the power of eminent domain and the entitlement of the holder
of the easement and the owner of the encumbered land to compensation upon condemnation. See
UCEA, supra note 16, Commissioners’ Prefatory Note.
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conservation easements that are donated in whole or in part as charitable gifts,
purchased with funds received or solicited for such purchase, purchased with
general funds, exacted as part of development approval processes, or acquired
in mitigation or other regulatory contexts.41 The UCEA also validates perpetual
conservation easements, term easements, and easements that expressly provide
that they are terminable in the discretion of the holder or upon the happening of
some event other than a judicial proceeding.42 Accordingly the laws governing the
administration of charities and charitable gifts or trusts will apply with different
force to different types of conservation easements, and attempting to address such
permutations in the UCEA was considered by the drafters to be neither necessary
nor wise.43 But the fact that the UCEA was never intended to abrogate such laws
could not be more clear.44
Finally, as with the comments to any Uniform Act, the comments to the
UCEA and the Uniform Trust Code (also adopted in Wyoming) should be relied
upon as a guide in interpreting those acts so as to achieve uniformity among the
states that have enacted them.45 As explained by the Connecticut Supreme Court:

41
The UCEA validates conservation easements that are (1) created for certain conservation
purposes and (2) conveyed to qualiﬁed “holders,” regardless of the context in which they are created.
See UCEA, supra note 16, § 1(1), (2) cmt.
42
The UCEA enables parties to create conservation easements of perpetual or lesser duration,
subject to the power of a court to modify or terminate the easements in accordance with the
principles of law and equity. See id. § 2(c), cmt.
43

E-mail from K. King Burnett, member and past president of NCCUSL and member of the
drafting committee for the UCEA, to Nancy A. McLaughlin (Nov. 13, 2009, 7:00pm MST) (on
ﬁle with authors).
44

As the discussion in this section makes clear, the Surrebuttal ’s argument that application
of charitable trust principles to conservation easements would require a “re-write” of existing law
is incorrect. See Surrebuttal, supra note 5, at 402. Rather, existing law would have to be rewritten
to specially exempt conservation easements conveyed as charitable gifts from the common and
statutory laws that govern the administration of charitable gifts made for speciﬁc purposes, which
laws the UCEA expressly left “intact.”
45

The comments to § 414 of the UTC provide:
Even though not accompanied by the usual trappings of a trust, the creation
and transfer of an easement for conservation or preservation will frequently create
a charitable trust. The organization to whom the easement was conveyed will be
deemed to be acting as trustee of what will ostensibly appear to be a contractual
or property arrangement. Because of the ﬁduciary obligation imposed, the
termination or substantial modiﬁcation of the easement by the “trustee” could
constitute a breach of trust. The drafters of the Uniform Trust Code concluded
that easements for conservation or preservation are sufﬁciently different from the
typical cash and securities found in small trusts that they should be excluded from
this section, and subsection (d) so provides. Most creators of such easements, it
was surmised, would prefer that the easement be continued unchanged even if the
easement, and hence the trust, has a relatively low market value.

UTC, supra note 16, § 414 cmt. (2005).
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Only if the intent of the drafters of a uniform act becomes the
intent of the legislature in adopting it can uniformity be achieved.
Otherwise, there would be as many variations of a uniform act
as there are legislatures that adopt it. Such a situation would
completely thwart the purpose of uniform laws.46
In sum, contrary to the assertion made in the Surrebuttal and The End of
Perpetuity, conservation easements are not mere creatures of property law, like
right-of-way easements between neighbors. As Professor McLaughlin has
explained:
Those who argue that donated perpetual conservation
easements can be modiﬁed or terminated in the same manner
as other easements—i.e., by agreement of the holder of the
easement and the owner of the encumbered land . . . —are
viewing such easements solely through a real property law
prism, and ignoring the fact that such easements are also
charitable gifts made for a speciﬁc charitable purpose. Whenever
any interest in real property, whether it be fee title to land or a
conservation easement, is donated to a municipality or charity
for a speciﬁc charitable purpose, both state real property law and
state charitable trust law should apply. State real property law
prescribes the procedural mechanisms by which real property
interests can be transferred and, in the case of easements,
modiﬁed or terminated. State charitable trust law governs
a donee’s use and disposition of property conveyed to it for a
speciﬁc charitable purpose. In other words, although state
real property law may provide that a conservation easement
can be modiﬁed or terminated by agreement of the holder of
the easement and the owner of the encumbered land . . . , the
holder of a perpetual conservation easement, in its capacity as
trustee, may not agree to modify or terminate the easement in
contravention of its stated purpose without ﬁrst obtaining court
approval in a cy pres proceeding.47

46

Yale Univ. v. Blumenthal, 621 A.2d 1304, 1307 (Conn. 1993) (citations omitted); see also
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-1101 (2009) (“In applying and construing [the WYUTC], consideration
shall be given to the need to promote uniformity of the law with respect to its subject matter among
states that enact it.”); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34-1-206 (2009) (“[The WYUCEA] shall be applied and
construed to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the laws with respect to the subject of
the Act among states enacting it.”); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 8-1-103(a)(vii) (2009) (“Any uniform act
shall be interpreted and construed to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those
states which enact it.”).
47

Perpetuity and Beyond, supra note 16, at 683.
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Bjork v. Draper
An Appellate Court of Illinois has already rejected the Surrebuttal ’s argument
that a perpetual conservation easement can be modiﬁed or terminated in
accordance with only the provisions of the applicable state conservation easement
enabling statute.48 In Bjork v. Draper, the court invalidated amendments to a
perpetual conservation easement that a land trust had approved at the request
of new owners of the encumbered land. The land trust argued that the Illinois
conservation easement enabling statute, which provides that a holder may
release a conservation easement, gave the land trust the lesser right to agree
to amendments, despite (1) the status of the easement as a tax-deductible
perpetual charitable gift, (2) the easement’s charitable purpose, which is to retain
“forever” the scenic and open space condition of the grounds of a historic home,
(3) provisions in the easement expressly prohibiting some of the activities authorized
by the amendments, and (4) the provision in the easement requiring that the
easement be extinguished, in whole or in part, only by judicial proceedings.49
The court ﬁrst determined that, because the easement expressly contemplated
amendments, the easement could be amended.50 The court then held, however,
that while protecting the conservation purpose of an easement in perpetuity does
not necessarily mean that the language of the easement can never be changed (the
court explained that an easement could be amended to add land, which would
most likely enhance the easement’s purpose), “no amendment is permissible if it
conﬂicts with other parts of the easement.”51
48

Bjork v. Draper, 886 N.E.2d 563 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008), appeal denied, 897 N.E.2d 249
(Ill. 2008). Conservation easement enabling statutes are the state real property statutes, many of
which are based on the UCEA, that sweep away the impediments under the common law of real
property that might otherwise undermine the validity of conservation easements held in gross. For
a somewhat dated survey of such statutes, see Todd D. Mayo, A Holistic Examination of the Law of
Conservation Easements, in PROTECTING THE LAND: CONSERVATION EASEMENTS PAST, PRESENT, AND
FUTURE 26 (Julie Ann Gustanski & Roderick H. Squires eds., 2000).
49
The Illinois easement enabling statute provides that conservation easements “may be
released by the holder of such rights to the holder of the fee even though the holder of the fee may
not be an agency of the State, a unit of local government or a not-for-proﬁt corporation or trust.”
765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/1(b) (2009).
50

Bjork, 886 N.E.2d at 572.

51

Id. at 574. The easement at issue in Bjork does not contain a standard amendment provision.
It states only that: “No alteration or variation of this instrument shall be valid or binding unless
contained in a written amendment ﬁrst executed by Grantors and Grantee, or their successors,
and recorded in the ofﬁcial records of Lake County, Illinois.” Id. at 572. That provision does not
expressly authorize the holder to agree to amendments or state the circumstances under which the
holder can agree to amendments. Rather, it states only that, to be valid and binding, an amendment
has to be written and recorded. In contrast, a standard amendment provision generally provides as
follows:
Amendment. If circumstances arise under which an amendment to or
modiﬁcation of this Easement would be appropriate, Grantors and Grantee are
free to jointly amend this Easement; provided that no amendment shall be allowed
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The court in Bjork was not presented with and, thus, did not address the
argument that the conservation easement constitutes a restricted charitable gift
or charitable trust. If the court had been presented with that argument, it could
possibly have ratiﬁed some of the amendments as permissible deviations from
the administrative terms of the easement, assuming any of the amendments
were consistent with the easement’s charitable conservation purpose.52 The court
properly held, however, that a perpetual conservation easement may not be
substantially amended or released by its holder at will, regardless of the seemingly
permissive language in the state easement enabling statute.
The land trust that agreed to the amendments in Bjork was aware of the
argument that conservation easements conveyed as charitable gifts constitute
restricted charitable gifts or charitable trusts.53 However, rather than requesting

that will affect the qualiﬁcation of this Easement or the status of Grantee under
any applicable laws, including [state statute] or Section 170(h) of the Internal
Revenue Code, and any amendment shall be consistent with the purpose of this
Easement and shall not affect its perpetual duration. Any such amendment shall
be recorded in the ofﬁcial records of __________ County, [state].
THOMAS S. BARRETT & STEFAN NAGEL, MODEL CONSERVATION EASEMENT AND HISTORIC PRESERVATION
EASEMENT, 1996: REVISED EASEMENTS AND COMMENTARY FROM “THE CONSERVATION EASEMENT
HANDBOOK” 22 (1996). Had the conservation easement at issue in Bjork contained a standard
amendment provision, the court presumably would have determined that the land trust had the
express power to agree to amendments that are consistent with the purpose of the easement and
otherwise comply with the terms of the amendment provision.
52

Whether any of the amendments were consistent with the purpose of the easement is
questionable. One of the amendments approved landscaping changes that obscured the public’s view
of the property and, thus, was inconsistent with the purpose of the easement. Bjork, 886 N.E.2d
at 571. Another of the amendments removed 809 square feet from the easement to allow the new
landowners to construct a driveway turnaround in exchange for the addition to the easement of 809
square feet from an adjacent lot. Id. at 568, 574. The removal of land from the easement constituted
a partial extinguishment rather than an amendment, and would have permitted a garage, carport,
or other structure to be constructed on the protected grounds in contravention of the purpose of
the easement. The amendment could have been drafted to permit the driveway turnaround in
exchange for the protection of an additional 809 square feet of land without releasing the original
809 square feet from the easement. Had this been done, the amendment would not have resulted
in the extinguishment of a portion of the easement or permitted construction of a structure on the
originally protected grounds in contravention of the purpose of the easement. In such a case, the
court may have been willing to ratify the amendment after the fact as a permissible administrative
deviation. See BOGERT ET AL., supra note 22, § 561 (“Occasionally a trustee acts beyond his powers
without court approval and later the validity of his act is presented for court determination on an
accounting or otherwise. It seems probable that the court will approve or ratify the conduct of the
trustee in exceeding his powers, after the ultra vires act has been done, in those cases where it would
have approved the proposed change if the matter had been submitted to it in advance.”).
53

In its petition for rehearing ﬁled with the Appellate Court of Illinois, the land trust noted:
Professor Nancy McLaughlin wrote an exhaustive article dealing with amendments
to conservation easements. McLaughlin, Rethinking the Perpetual Nature of
Conservation Easements, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 421 (2005). Professor McLaughlin
points out that as the number of acres subject to conservation easement [sic]
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that the court ratify the amendments as permissible administrative deviations, the
land trust argued (like the author of the Surrebuttal) that land trusts have the right
to simply agree with subsequent owners of the burdened land to amend or release
conservation easements, in whole or in part, regardless of the manner in which the
easements were acquired or their express terms. That strategy backﬁred, and the
land trust obtained a holding that constrains the ability to amend conservation
easements in Illinois far more than would charitable trust principles.54

Donor Assumptions
The Surrebuttal asserts that conservation easement donors “reasonably
assume that the easements they convey may be modiﬁed or terminated in the
same manner as other easements, i.e., if both parties to the easement agree.”55
Such an assumption would be astonishing given the express terms of conservation
easement deeds, as well as the representations made by land trusts to conservation
easement donors and the public regarding the perpetual nature of conservation
easements.
Most conservation easement deeds (like the easement deed at issue in Salzburg
v. Dowd) contain detailed terms regarding the prohibited and permitted uses of
the property, and further expressly provide that: (1) the purpose of the easement is
to protect certain conservation attributes of the particular land encumbered by the
easement in perpetuity, (2) the easement is transferable only to another government
entity or charitable organization that agrees to continue to enforce the easement,
and (3) the easement is extinguishable (other than through condemnation) only in
a judicial proceeding. In addition, consistent with best practices as recommended
continues to increase, the need to make modiﬁcations and adjustment to account
for changed conditions and societal needs may also increase. She does not suggest
that the easement holder and property owner should have an unlimited right to
amend, but urges that all amendments be in the framework of the charitable trust
rules . . . because “such rules were developed and reﬁned over the centuries to deal
precisely with the issue presented by conservation easements . . .” McLaughlin, p.
429. While the charitable trust doctrine has not been raised in this case, it may serve to
provide guidelines for conservation easement amendments in the future.
See Defendant/Appellee’s Rule 367 Petition for Rehearing and Rule 316 Application for a Certiﬁcate
of Importance at 9–10, Bjork v. Draper, 886 N.E.2d 563 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008) (No. 2-06-1145)
(emphasis added). The land trust’s petition for rehearing was denied, as was its petition for leave to
appeal ﬁled with the Supreme Court of Illinois.
54

In support of its claim that conservation easements are modiﬁable and terminable by
simple agreement of the parties thereto, the Surrebuttal asserts that “it is a fundamental principal
[sic] of all agreements that they are amendable if the parties thereto agree to amend them, even
if the agreements in question expressly prohibit amendment (because even a prohibition against
amendment can be amended away by the parties to the agreement).” Surrebuttal, supra note 5, at
408. It is clear, however, that the Illinois Appellate Court would not agree with this claim as applied
to conservation easements, nor would the American Law Institute, NCCUSL, Congress, or the
Internal Revenue Service.
55

Surrebuttal, supra note 5, at 404 (emphasis omitted).
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by the Land Trust Alliance, many land trusts and government entities negotiate
for the discretion to agree to amend conservation easements in certain limited
circumstances and memorialize that grant of discretion in easement deeds in the
form of an amendment provision.56 It would be remarkable if a landowner signing
a conservation easement deed containing such provisions assumed the holder was
not bound by them and, instead, could simply agree with a subsequent owner of
the land to modify, transfer, or terminate the easement “in the same manner as
other easements.”
Land trusts also routinely represent to landowners and the public that a
conservation easement permanently protects the particular parcel of land it
encumbers, and the speciﬁc restrictions on development and use of the land in
the easement deed will run with land and bind all future owners. The Jackson
Hole Land Trust—with which the author of the Surrebuttal is afﬁliated—is a case
in point.57 Under Easement Basics on its website, the Jackson Hole Land Trust
explains:
A conservation easement is a voluntary contract between
a landowner and a land trust, government agency or another
qualiﬁed organization in which the owner places permanent
restrictions on the future uses of some or all of their property to
protect scenic, wildlife, or agricultural resources (conservation
values).
. . . The easement is donated by the landowner to the land
trust, which then has the authority and obligation to enforce the
terms of the easement in perpetuity. The landowner still owns
the property and can use it, sell it, or leave it to heirs, but the
restrictions of the easement stay with the land forever.58
Similar representations can be found in the promotional materials of the Land
Trust Alliance and virtually every land trust.59 In light of these representations, it
would again be remarkable if the donor of a conservation easement assumed that
the holder could simply agree with a subsequent owner of the land to modify,
56

See supra note 26 and accompanying text. For a sample standard amendment provision,
see supra note 51. While the standard amendment provision grants the holder the right to agree
with the owner of the land to amendments that are consistent with the purpose of the conservation
easement, some donors do not wish to grant holders such broad amendment discretion and
will customize the amendment provision to, for example, preclude the holder from agreeing to
amendments that would increase the level of residential development permitted on the property. See
In Defense of Conservation Easements, supra note 4, at 45–46.
57
The Jackson Hole Land Trust has employed the author of the Surrebuttal as its Director of
Protection and Staff Attorney since 2000. See Jackson Hole Land Trust, Our Board & Staff, http://
jhlandtrust.org/about/ctimothylindstrom.htm (last visited Nov. 29, 2009).
58
Jackson Hole Land Trust, Easement Basics, http://jhlandtrust.org/protection/easement.htm
(last visited Nov. 20, 2009) (emphasis added).
59

See In Defense of Conservation Easements, supra note 4, at 9–15.
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transfer, or terminate the easement “in the same manner as other easements.”
When the donor of a conservation easement is told by a land trust that the
carefully negotiated restrictions in the easement deed will “stay with the land
forever” and that the land trust “has the obligation to enforce the terms of the
easement in perpetuity,” the donor is far more likely to assume that the holder
means what it says, and that the holder will be legally bound to enforce the terms
of the easement as written.
There also is an assumption implicit in the Surrebutal that must be spotlighted:
that conservation easement grantors neither care nor should be heard to express
concern over time about the precise terms of their conservation easement deeds
or the long-term protection of the particular property encumbered by their
easements. That assumption is unfounded. Surveys of easement donors indicate
that many landowners feel more like the author of the Surrebuttal says he feels
about his family farms: they are willing to donate conservation easements in large
part because of a personal attachment to the particular land encumbered by the
easement and a desire to see that land permanently preserved.60 Indeed, the land
trust movement was built on promises made to individual landowners about
the perpetual protection of their land according to the terms they specify in their
conservation easement deeds.61
This does not mean that conservation easements are immutable,
unchangeable documents. Rather, it means that land trusts should negotiate for
the discretion to amend conservation easements in manners consistent with their
stated purposes up front and in good faith with easement donors at the time of
acquisition, and memorialize that grant of discretion in the easement deeds in
the form of an amendment provision. Land trusts should not acquire expressly
perpetual conservation easements with carefully negotiated terms, promise that
the restrictions in the easements will “stay with the land forever,” and then take
the position that they are free to simply agree with subsequent owners of the land
to substantially modify or terminate the easements. In addition to violating its
ﬁduciary duties to the donor and the public, a land trust that takes such a position
may ﬁnd itself guilty of fraudulent solicitation.62

60
Surrebuttal, supra note 5, at 412 (“As an easement donor myself, the last thing I want to
see is reversal of the conservation of two family farms to which I made an economic and emotional
commitment, particularly as the ownership of these farms is no longer mine.”); see also In Defense of
Conservation Easements, supra note 4, at 15 (discussing surveys of easement donors).
61

See In Defense of Conservation Easements, supra note 4, at 9–15 (detailing the representations
land trusts make to conservation easement donors regarding perpetual protection of the donors’
land, and explaining that donors do care about the speciﬁc restrictions in their conservation
easement deeds).
62

Id. at 15–16 (discussing fraudulent solicitation).
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Chilling Conservation Easement Donations
The Surrebuttal asserts that “[t]he effect of imposing the kind of uncertainty
and potential bureaucratic burden on the daily administration of conservation
easements that could arise from a broad application of the charitable trust doctrine
is sure to discourage many landowners from the use of conservation easements.”63
That logic is backwards.
The standard amendment provision in a conservation easement deed grants
the holder the right to simply agree with the owner of the land to amendments
that are consistent with the easement’s stated charitable conservation purpose.64
Moreover, it is black letter law that when a trustee is granted such a discretionary
power, the trustee’s exercise of that power is subject to oversight by the state
attorney general and the courts only to prevent abuse.65 In other words, neither
the courts nor the attorney general would be permitted to second-guess a land
trust’s exercise of such a discretionary power unless there had been a clear abuse.66
Accordingly, a landowner who donates a conservation easement containing a
standard amendment provision can expect attorney general or court involvement
in the administration of the easement only if the holder attempts to terminate the
easement, or amend it in a manner clearly inconsistent with its stated conservation
purpose—as is contemplated by federal tax law in any event.67 Charitable trust
principles thus impose no additional “bureaucratic burden” on properly advised
donors and holders, and, therefore, cannot be expected to discourage future
donations. Indeed, if such principles are properly explained, prospective easement
donors should welcome their application because they will operate to safeguard
the purposes of their gifts, as in the Myrtle Grove controversy and, hopefully,
Salzburg v. Dowd.
On the other hand, what “is sure to discourage many landowners from the
use of conservation easements” is the prospect that land trust and government
63

Surrebuttal, supra note 5, at 412.

64

See In Defense of Conservation Easements, supra note 4, at 42–43.

65

Id.

See id. at 43 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 87 cmt. b (2003) (“A court will
not interfere with a trustee’s exercise of a discretionary power . . . when that conduct is reasonable,
not based on an improper interpretation of the terms of the trust, and not otherwise inconsistent
with the trustee’s ﬁduciary duties . . . Thus, judicial intervention is not warranted merely because the
court would have differently exercised the discretion.”). On the other hand, in cases where there has
been a clear abuse, as in the Myrtle Grove controversy or Salzburg v. Dowd, the attorney general is a
proper party to bring an action to enforce the conservation easement on behalf of the donor and the
public. See supra notes 2, 23, and accompanying text (discussing Salzburg v. Dowd and the Myrtle
Grove controversy, respectively).
66

67
See In Defense of Conservation Easements, supra note 4, at 75–79 (describing the requirements
under federal tax law for tax-deductible conservation easements).
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holders will take the position that, regardless of the express terms of easement
deeds, holders are free to modify or terminate easements as they may see ﬁt to, for
example, accommodate the wishes of new owners of the land or raise cash to fund
other ostensibly “better” projects or programs. In other words, what will surely
chill future conservation easement donations is the prospect that land trusts and
government holders will take the position espoused in The End of Perpetuity and
the Surrebuttal: that perpetual conservation easements, regardless of their terms,
are, at base, fungible or liquid assets, like “other easements.”

The “Partnership” Red Herring
The Surrebuttal argues that the “partnership” created upon the donation of
a conservation easement between the owner of the land and the holder of the
easement distinguishes the gift of a conservation easement from other forms of
charitable gifts.68 The creation of this partnership, so the argument goes, supports
exempting gifts of conservation easements from the laws that apply to all other
charitable gifts made for speciﬁc purposes. There is, however, no basis in the law
or policy for creating such an exemption.
As discussed above, the UCEA and other conservation easement enabling
statutes were not intended to abrogate the well-settled principles that apply when
property, such as a conservation easement, is conveyed as a charitable gift to be
used for a speciﬁc charitable purpose. Rather, the laws governing charities and the
charitable gifts they solicit and accept were left “intact.”
In addition, donors do not expect that their gifts of conservation easements
will receive less protection under state law than all other forms of charitable gifts;
indeed, it is likely they expect such gifts will receive more protection given the
importance and visibility of land and land conservation.69 Donors also do not
expect that the carefully wrought restrictions in their easement deeds may be
terminated or amended away by the holder at the request of future owners of
the land.70 And purchasers of conservation easement-encumbered land (such as
the Dowds) cannot be heard to complain because they have at least constructive
notice of the easement’s perpetual restrictions and they generally pay a muchreduced price for the land as a result of those restrictions.
Moreover, as discussed in In Defense of Conservation Easements, any charitable
organization could make the same complaints about the application of charitable
68

See Surrebuttal, supra note 5, at 406.

69

See, e.g., Afﬁdavit of Paul Lowham at 4–5, Hicks v. Dowd, 157 P.3d 914 (Wyo 2007) (Civ.
No. CV-2003-00057) (“It was the intention of the Lowham Family, that the conservation easement
be held and operated by the Scenic Preserve Trust and they hired legal counsel to see that this was
done. The conservation easement was a gift of immeasurable value to the people of Johnson County
and the State of Wyoming from the Lowham Limited Partnership.”).
70

See supra notes 56–61 and accompanying text (discussing donor assumptions).
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trust principles as are made on behalf of land trusts in The End of Perpetuity
and the Surrebuttal—that complying with such principles can, at times, be
inconvenient, costly, and time consuming.71 Indeed, other charities have faced
similar challenges, but none have made the novel argument that they be specially
exempted from the state laws governing charities and the charitable gifts they
solicit and accept.72
Most importantly, though, the “procrustean bed” in which the Surrebuttal
argues that land trusts are forced to lie is self-made and can easily be avoided.73
To repeat: a land trust that negotiates for the inclusion of a standard amendment
provision in the conservation easement deeds it acquires has the right to simply
agree with the owner of the land to amend the easement in any manner consistent
with its stated charitable conservation purpose without attorney general or court
approval. In such cases, court and attorney general involvement will be necessary
only if the land trust seeks to terminate the easement, or “amend” it in a manner
clearly contrary to its purpose—as is contemplated by federal tax law in any event.
Accordingly, charitable trust principles impose no additional burdens on properly
advised land trusts. Rather, they simply require that land trusts, like all other
charities, administer the charitable gifts they solicit and accept in accordance with
the donors’ stated charitable purposes.74
It is, of course, true that some landowners are not willing to grant an easement
holder broad discretion to amend a conservation easement in any manner consistent
with its stated purpose.75 Some landowners wish to customize the amendment
provision to, for example, preclude the holder from agreeing to amendments that
71

See In Defense of Conservation Easements, supra note 4, at 29, 81.

72

For example, the Robertsons’ gift of funds to Princeton University that ended in a celebrated
dispute involved an ongoing partnership between Princeton and the donors’ heirs regarding the
management and use of the gifted funds. See generally Iris J. Goodwin, Ask Not What Your Charity
Can Do For You: Robertson v. Princeton Provides Liberal-Democratic Insights Into The Dilemma of Cy
Pres Reform, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 75 (2009) (discussing the gift and the dispute). Although Princeton
and the donors’ heirs disagreed regarding the interpretation of the donors’ charitable purpose in
making the gift, both understood that state law governing the use of restricted charitable gifts
applied to the dispute. Id. at 99 (“No party to Robertson v. Princeton denied that the Robertsons’
1961 gift to the Robertson Foundation for the beneﬁt of the Woodrow Wilson School is governed
by the restrictive language found in [the] Robertson Foundation Certiﬁcate of Incorporation, and
that the effect of this language was to restrict the purposes for which the funds contributed by
Charles and Marie Robertson might be applied.”). See also In Defense of Conservation Easements,
supra note 4, at 49 n.178 (discussing the approach of museums and of charities holding institutional
funds to the challenges posed by restricted charitable gifts; neither group has argued that they
should be specially exempted from the state laws governing charities and the charitable gifts they
solicit and accept).
73

See Surrebuttal, supra note 5, at 410.

74

See also supra notes 17–32 and accompanying text (explaining the manner in which
charitable trust principles should apply to easement amendments in the absence of an amendment
provision, and that the Surrebuttal ’s claims with respect thereto are incorrect).
75

See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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would increase the level of residential development permitted on the property. In
that event, the land trust can simply refuse to accept the easement, or it can accept
the easement knowing that its ability to amend absent attorney general and court
involvement will be more circumscribed. In such cases—where a donor refuses to
grant the holder broad amendment discretion—it would be even more absurd to
argue that the holder nonetheless has that discretion.
In sum, while conservation easements do inevitably involve an ongoing
partnership between the owner of the burdened land and the holder of the
easement, that partnership is not a reason to ignore donor intent or exempt
the government entities and land trusts holding such easements from oversight
at the state level. Rather, it is a reason for government entities and land trusts
acquiring conservation easements to consider ex ante the ﬂexibility they may need
to amend the easements consistent with their stated purposes, and negotiate for
that discretion up front and in good faith when acquiring easements.

State Constitutions Do Not Provide Sufﬁcient Safeguards
The Surrebuttal recommends that the termination of the conservation
easement involved in Salzburg v. Dowd be voided, not because Johnson County
violated its ﬁduciary duties to the donor and the public by agreeing to terminate
the easement outside of a cy pres proceeding, but because the County’s transfer
of the easement to the Dowds was in violation of the Wyoming Constitution’s
prohibition on the transfer of public assets to private individuals without adequate
consideration.76 The Surrebuttal then implies that improper terminations of
conservation easements by government entities can be similarly remedied in most
states, thus obviating the need for the application of charitable trust principles to
such easements.77
It is true that most state constitutions prohibit government entities from
transferring their assets to private persons without adequate consideration.78 Like
the private beneﬁt and private inurement prohibitions applicable to land trusts,
however, these state constitutional prohibitions do not ensure that government
entities will administer the conservation easements they hold in accordance
with the easements’ stated terms and purposes.79 If all government holders were
required to do is avoid running afoul of the state constitutional prohibitions, and
if conservation easements were modiﬁable and terminable “in the same manner
76

See Surrebuttal, supra note 5, at 411.

77

See id.

78

See In Defense of Conservation Easements, supra note 4, at 76 n.294.

79

See infra notes 95, 96 and accompanying text. For a detailed discussion of the private beneﬁt
and private inurement provisions and how they cannot be relied upon to ensure that land trusts
administer conservation easements in accordance with the easements’ stated terms and purposes, see
In Defense of Conservation Easements, supra note 4, at 74–82.
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as other easements” as the Surrebuttal argues, then government entities would
be free to sell, trade, release, extinguish, or otherwise dispose of the perpetual
conservation easements they hold, provided only that they receive appropriate
compensation and use that compensation consistent with their broad public
missions. In other words, government entities would be free to sell conservation
easements to the highest bidder and use the proceeds to, for example, build
roads or fund public schools. As with land trusts, the continued administration
of conservation easements in accordance with their stated terms and purposes
depends on a government holder’s ﬁduciary obligations to the easement donor
and the public under state charitable trust law or similar equitable principles.

The “Private” Misnomer
The Surrebuttal asserts that land trusts are “private” and conservation
easements are “privately held” and “privately administered.”80 This is an odd
claim, given that most land trusts qualiﬁed to hold conservation easements are
publicly-supported charitable organizations, they receive substantial tax and other
beneﬁts because of the public purposes they serve, and, like all other charitable
organizations, they are subject to oversight on behalf of the public by both state
and federal regulators.81
Moreover, conservation easements themselves and their administration over
the long term are also not “private.” A private servitude is a private contract
between private parties created for private beneﬁt, such as a traditional right-ofway easement agreed to between neighbors. In contrast, conservation easements
are validated under state law only if they are (1) created for certain conservation
or historic preservation purposes intended to beneﬁt the public and (2) conveyed
to a government entity or charitable organization to be held and enforced for
the beneﬁt of the public.82 The public heavily subsidizes the acquisition of
conservation easements through appropriations to easement-purchase programs
and the provision of tax beneﬁts to landowners who donate conservation easements
as charitable gifts.83 And the importance of conservation easements to the public
will only continue to increase as population growth exerts ever-greater pressures

80

See Surrebuttal, supra note 5, at 401, 409.

See generally MARION FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS (2004)
(describing state and federal regulation of charities in the United States).
81

82

See, e.g., UCEA, supra note 16, § 1(1), (2). See also supra note 48 (referencing a survey of
state conservation easement enabling statutes).
See ELIZABETH BYERS & KARIN MARCHETTI PONTE, THE CONSERVATION EASEMENT HANDBOOK
9 (2d ed. 2005) (describing easement purchase programs); Nancy A. McLaughlin, Increasing the
Tax Incentives for Conservation Easement Donations—A Responsible Approach, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1
(2004) (describing the federal tax incentives); DEBRA PENTZ, THE CONSERVATION RESOURCE CENTER,
STATE CONSERVATION TAX CREDITS: IMPACT AND ANALYSIS (2007) (describing the state tax incentives),
available at http://conserveland.org/lpr/library?parent_id=18216 (last visited Nov. 29, 2009).
83
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on undeveloped land, ecosystems, and wildlife.84 Accordingly, the public, which
heavily invests in and is the beneﬁciary of the conservation and historic beneﬁts
provided by conservation easements, has a signiﬁcant stake in ensuring the proper
enforcement of such easements over time.
This was recognized by the drafters of the Restatement (Third) of Property:
Servitudes. Rather than providing that conservation easements are modiﬁable and
terminable “in the same manner as other easements,” as the Surrebuttal advocates,
the Restatement provides just the opposite. Pursuant to the Restatement, the
modiﬁcation and termination of conservation easements held by government
entities and charitable organizations are governed by a special set of rules based on
charitable trust principles, and those rules apply regardless of how the easements
were acquired. The drafters explained that “Because of the public interests
involved, these servitudes are afforded more stringent protection than privately
held conservation servitudes.”85

State Attorneys General
The Surrebuttal repeats the assertion made in The End of Perpetuity that state
attorneys general may use the charitable trust doctrine as a “a sword” to “pierce”
conservation easements.86 This time, the author cites to a conversation with a
former Wyoming Attorney General and a Wyoming state legislator in support
of the assertion.87 The assertion is, however, no more compelling or correct the
second time around.
As explained in detail in In Defense of Conservation Easements, state attorneys
general are charged with protecting the public interest in charitable assets.88 They
also take seriously their obligation to ensure the intent of charitable donors is
honored because they recognize that disregarding donor intent would chill future
charitable donations.89 Moreover, even if a rogue attorney general were to ﬁle
suit in an attempt to terminate a conservation easement in favor of development
interests, the authority to apply the doctrine of cy pres is vested in the courts, not
the attorney general.90 And for the reasons noted in In Defense of Conservation
Easements, it would be a profound departure from settled precedent for a court to
authorize the termination of a conservation easement if the easement continued
to provide signiﬁcant beneﬁts to the public.91
84

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 7.11 cmt. a (2000).

85

Id.

86

See Surrebuttal, supra note 5, at 409–10.

87

See id.

88

See In Defense of Conservation Easements, supra note 4, at 73.

89

See id.

90

See id. at 74.

91

See id. at 70–74.
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The Surrebuttal ’s assertion that state attorneys general will attempt to use
their position as supervisor of charitable gifts and trusts to terminate conservation
easements in favor of development interests is even more remarkable in light of
the evidence in the author’s own state. The Wyoming Attorney General has spent
considerable time and resources defending the intent of the donor and the interests
of the public with regard to the conservation easement at issue in Salzburg v. Dowd,
despite competing priorities and limited resources.92 The Maryland Attorney
General did the same in the context of the Myrtle Grove controversy.93 Salzburg v.
Dowd and the Myrtle Grove controversy provide concrete evidence that, contrary
to the unsupported assertions made in the Surrebuttal and The End of Perpetuity,
state attorneys general take seriously their obligation to protect the interests of
donors and the public in charitable gifts, and they can be powerful allies to the
land conservation community in cases involving the wrongful “amendment” or
termination of conservation easements.94

Emasculating the States
The Surrebuttal recommends that Wyoming (and all other states) be deprived
of their longstanding right to supervise the activities of the municipalities and
charities that operate within their borders, and to call those entities to account
for breaches of their ﬁduciary duties in one context: conservation easements. In
a world structured according to the Surrebuttal, a state would have no power
to require that conservation easement holders honor the terms of the easements
protecting land within the state’s borders. Rather, the only recourse available to a
state and the citizens therein in the event a municipality or land trust improperly
amended or terminated a conservation easement (as in Salzburg v. Dowd or the
Myrtle Grove controversy) would be to look to the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS), the enforcement powers of which are indirect, at best.95 Even assuming
the IRS had the resources and interest to involve itself in the enforcement of the
thousands of conservation easements encumbering millions of acres across the
ﬁfty states, the IRS does not have the power to declare an improper conservation
easement amendment or termination null and void, or remove and replace the
92

See, e.g., AG’s Motion for SJ, supra note 10.

93

See generally Nancy A. McLaughlin, Amending Perpetual Conservation Easements: A Case
Study of the Myrtle Grove Controversy, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 1031 (2006) (detailing the Maryland
Attorney General’s defense of the conservation easement at issue in the Myrtle Grove controversy).
See also FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 81, at 447–48 (explaining that, while state attorneys
general regulate charities, they also function as supporters of and advocates for charities).
94

95

The IRS could, for example, impose ﬁnancial sanctions on an insider who receives an
economic beneﬁt from a land trust as a result of an easement amendment or termination, or
revoke the tax-exempt status of a land trust that confers private beneﬁt on a landowner in such
circumstances. See In Defense of Conservation Easements, supra note 4, at 74–82. However, neither
sanction would restore a conservation easement that had been improperly amended or terminated,
or prevent amendments or terminations agreed to in exchange for an appropriate amount of cash or
other compensation. Moreover, government entities are not subject to even these indirect sanctions.
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holder of an easement, or enjoin the holder from future wrongdoing; those key
remedies are the province of state courts.96
The Surrebuttal attempts to reassure the reader that depriving the states of
the ability to call easement holders to account for breaches of their ﬁduciary
duties should be of no concern because conservation easements are “privately
administered” and, with intensiﬁed training from the Land Trust Alliance and the
Alliance’s recent accreditation program, land trusts can be relied upon to always do
the right thing.97 But that is cold comfort given the long history of abuses in the
charitable context and the inevitable ﬁnancial, political, and other pressures that
will be brought to bear on holders to substantially modify, release, or terminate
conservation easements.98 As explained in In Defense of Conservation Easements,
negligence, malfeasance, and the use of assets for purposes other than those
speciﬁed by the donor are not unknown in the charitable context, and there is no
reason to believe that land trusts holding conservation easements will be the ﬁrst
class of entities in history to be immune to such abuses.99 Moreover, many other
segments of the charitable sector, such as universities, museums, and religious
organizations, have much more mature self-regulatory accreditation programs,
and they are not thereby exempted from the state laws governing charities and
the charitable gifts they solicit and accept.100 The Surrebuttal also fails to explain
how its plan to emasculate the states would affect the thousands of conservation

96

See In Defense of Conservation Easements, supra note 4, at 81 (“[I]t is state courts, rather than
the Tax Court or the IRS, that possess the broad range of equitable powers necessary to protect assets
dedicated to charitable purposes.”).
97

See Surrebuttal, supra note 5, at 412.

98

These pressures may be brought to bear on the executive director and board members
of a land trust 25, 50, or 75 years hence—when the current executive director and current board
members and all their best intentions and loyalties to existing donors are long gone. Moreover,
such pressures are likely to be particularly intense in the conservation easement context because
development pressures can be expected to rise as undeveloped land becomes increasingly scarce,
and there is enormous economic value inherent in the development and use rights restricted by
conservation easements. See In Defense of Conservation Easements, supra note 4, at 61–62.
99

See id. at 61.

See, e.g., PANEL ON THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, PRINCIPLES FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE AND
ETHICAL PRACTICE: A GUIDE FOR CHARITIES AND FOUNDATIONS 78–81 (reference ed. Oct. 2007)
available at http://www.nonproﬁtpanel.org/Report/index.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2009) (listing
numerous self-regulatory accreditation programs for nonproﬁt organizations). This report also
discusses the legal obligations of nonproﬁt organizations, explaining, for example:
100

If a donor provides a clear, written directive about how funds are to be used
at the time a charitable gift is made, the board of the recipient organization has
a ﬁduciary obligation to comply with the donor’s directive and state attorneys
general may enforce compliance. . . . An organization’s communications while it
is soliciting contributions may also create a legally binding restriction that can be
enforced under state and federal fraudulent solicitation prohibitions.
Id. at 43.
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easements held by the hundreds of government entities across the nation, which
entities are subject to even less oversight by the IRS than are land trusts.101
Salzburg v. Dowd, Bjork v. Draper, and the Myrtle Grove controversy, as well
as a controversy involving a Wal-Mart,102 starkly illustrate why there must be
a means by which holders of conservation easements can be held accountable
for breaches of their ﬁduciary duties to both easement donors and the public.103
Emasculating the states when it comes to calling easement holders to account for
such breaches would not only be contrary to existing law, it would be bad policy.
This was recognized by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws in its adoption of the UCEA and the Uniform Trust Code, as well as
by the American Law Institute in its promulgation of the Restatement (Third) of
Property: Servitudes.104 This was also recognized by Congress and the Treasury
Department in enacting and issuing, respectively, § 170(h) of the Internal
Revenue Code and the accompanying Treasury Regulations, which effectively
require that the donation of a tax-deductible conservation easement be in the
form of a restricted charitable gift or charitable trust.105

Pyrrhic Victory
To some land trusts, the position espoused in the Surrebuttal—that
conservation easements should be modiﬁable, transferrable, and terminable
101
See In Defense of Conservation Easements, supra note 4, at 77. The End of Perpetuity proposes
two unrealistic and unsatisfactory “solutions” to the problem of lack of oversight of government
holders in the event states are denied enforcement powers. See In Defense of Conservation Easements,
supra note 4, at 77 n.297.
102
The Wal-Mart controversy involved a four-lane road providing access to a Wal-Mart
Supercenter that was constructed across land protected by a perpetual conservation easement.
Two nonproﬁt organizations and a private citizen sued the owner of the encumbered land (the
development corporation that had sold the adjacent land to Wal-Mart) and the holder of the
easement (the city of Chattanooga) objecting to the road. The case settled, and the development
corporation agreed to convey a replacement parcel of land and $500,000 to the plaintiffs to be used
for similar conservation purposes and to pay the plaintiffs’ not insubstantial legal fees. In approving
the settlement, the court concluded that the charitable purpose of the easement had become, in
part, “impossible or impractical,” and the property and cash transferred to the plaintiffs constituted
a reasonable and adequate substitute for any portion of the property that may have been affected or
taken as a result of the road construction. See Perpetuity and Beyond, supra note 16, at 678, 695–700.
103
Contrary to the assertion made in the Surrebuttal, the “problems” in the Myrtle Grove
and Wal-Mart controversies were not “voluntarily corrected.” See Surrebuttal, supra note 5, at
412. Rather, they were corrected through settlement only after suit was brought in state court. See
Perpetuity and Beyond, supra note 16, at 690–93, 695–700. Moreover, the IRS did not involve itself,
directly or indirectly, in either the Wal-Mart or Myrtle Grove controversies, or in Hicks v. Dowd,
Salzburg v. Dowd, or Bjork v. Draper.
104

See supra note 16 and accompanying text.

105

See In Defense of Conservation Easements, supra note 4, at 78–91 (explaining that the
real check that federal tax law places on the conservation easement amendment and termination
activities of land trusts and government entities depends on state charitable trust law).
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by mere agreement of the owner of the land and the holder of the easement,
and that states should have no oversight authority with regard to conservation
easements—may have superﬁcial appeal. If courts in a state were to accept that
position, however, the consequences to the land trust community could be grave.
A landowner donating a conservation easement is eligible for a federal
charitable income tax deduction pursuant to § 170(h) of the Internal Revenue Code
only if the conservation easement is “granted in perpetuity” and its conservation
purpose is “protected in perpetuity.” In explaining these perpetuity requirements,
the Treasury Regulations provide that, among other things, a conservation
easement must be (1) expressly transferable only to another government entity
or charitable organization that agrees to continue to enforce the easement, and
(2) extinguishable by its holder only in a judicial proceeding, upon a ﬁnding that
the continued use of the encumbered land for conservation purposes has become
impossible or impractical, and with the payment of a share of the proceeds from
the subsequent sale or development of the land to the holder to be used for similar
conservation purposes.106
The donor of the conservation easement at issue in Salzburg v. Dowd
attempted to comply with these requirements. The donor expressly provided in
the conservation easement deed that the purpose of the easement is to preserve
and protect certain conservation attributes of the land burdened by the easement
in perpetuity.107 The donor also expressly provided that the easement can be
transferred or extinguished only in the circumstances set forth in the Treasury
Regulations.108 If Wyoming courts were to adopt the Surrebuttal’s position—that
a conservation easement may be modiﬁed, transferred, or terminated by mere
agreement of the owner of the land and the holder of the easement, regardless of
the status of the easement as a restricted charitable gift or its express terms—the
IRS could readily conclude that there simply is no way conservation easements
donated in Wyoming could meet the federal tax law requirements for deductibility.
Congress might also deem it imprudent to continue subsidizing the acquisition
of conservation easements nationwide and repeal the federal tax incentives for
easement donations altogether. Accordingly, even if courts in a state could be
convinced to deny themselves their historic and inherent jurisdiction with respect
to matters relating to charitable gifts in the conservation easement context (i.e.,
if they could be convinced to accept the position espoused in the Surrebuttal), it
would likely prove to be a Pyrrhic victory for Surrebuttal enthusiasts.109
106

See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(c)(2), -14(g)(6) (2009).

107

See Lowham Conservation Easement, supra note 15, at 2.

108

See id. at 8–9.

A “Pyrrhic victory” is a victory offset by staggering losses. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1476 (3d ed. 1992). The phrase is named after Macedonian
King Pyrrhus of Epirus, whose army, although defeating the Roman army in a 280 B.C. battle at
Heraclea, suffered such severe and irreplaceable casualties that the phrase “Pyrrhic victory” became
the proverbial expression for an over-expensive gain. See PETER CONNOLLY, GREECE AND ROME AT
WAR 90 (Prentice-Hall 1981).
109
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Logical Incoherence
Finally, the Surrebuttal opines that, if it were possible to contain the application
of the charitable trust doctrine to cases such as Salzburg v. Dowd—those involving
an “outright, unmitigated easement termination”—then “the implications of the
doctrine for conservation easement administration might be of less concern.”110
The Surrebuttal further notes that “[i]t is in the application of the doctrine to
modiﬁcations that negative implications for efﬁcient and reasonable easement
administration arise.”111 The Surrebuttal then acknowledges, however, that
“[o]f course, the problem is that one can effectively terminate an easement by
amendment nearly as effectively as by outright termination.”112
The Surrebuttal offers no answer to this conundrum: that applying charitable
trust principles to the termination, but not modiﬁcation, of conservation easements
leaves the door open to the effective termination of easements through cleverly
designed “modiﬁcations.” One can only assume that, if asked to respond to this
conundrum (and in the absence of the enactment of the unspeciﬁed new “remedy”
he calls for),113 the author of the Surrebuttal would return to the position that
underlies all of his arguments: land trusts and, by extension, government entities
should simply be trusted to do the right thing. For all the reasons previously
discussed, that response simply cannot satisfy the needs of easement donors and
the public. Far better for land trusts and government holders to negotiate for the
discretion they need “for efﬁcient and reasonable administration” up front and
in good faith at the time of their easement acquisitions. And far better for the
states to retain their longstanding right to oversee the activities of the government
entities and nonproﬁts soliciting and accepting all manner of charitable gifts
within their borders, including conservation easements.
In conclusion, conservation easement donors, like all other charitable donors,
should have assurance that the charitable purposes to which they dedicate their
property will be honored. The law should not leave them to ﬁnd that, instead
of having sacriﬁced a more comfortable life and a legacy for their heirs so as to
conserve a beloved farm or ranch, they have, instead, merely made a fungible
gift of resources to an entity unwilling to make a durable commitment to the
protection of that land. If a government entity or land trust wishes to be able
to modify or terminate the conservation easements it acquires as it may see ﬁt
in accomplishing its public or charitable mission over time, it should negotiate
for that discretion up front and in good faith at the time of acquisition. Donors
would then have the choice to give under those conditions, or not.
110

See Surrebuttal, supra note 5, at 411.

111

Id.

112

Id.

113

See id. at 412 (calling for the creation of some new “remedy for improper easement
administration”). As discussed at length in In Defense of Conservation Easements, there are potentially
signiﬁcant constitutional and other problems with attempting to apply new state law “remedies” to
existing or future conservation easements, and the creation of such new remedies is unnecessary. See
In Defense of Conservation Easements, supra note 4, at 87–94.
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APPENDIX A
EXCERPT FROM WYOMING ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN SALZBURG V. DOWD***
C. Lowham’s Charitable Donation of the Conservation Easement either
created a Charitable Trust or constituted a Restricted Charitable Gift,
and the Board Breached its Fiduciary Duties by Failing to Obtain Judicial
Approval for the Transfer and Termination of the Easement in a Cy Pres
Proceeding
1. Lowham’s Charitable Donation of the Conservation Easement either
created a Charitable Trust or constituted a Restricted Charitable Gift
Lowham’s charitable donation of the conservation easement to the Board [of
County Commissioners of Johnson County, Wyoming] for the express purpose
of preserving and protecting in perpetuity the natural, agricultural, ecological,
wildlife habitat, open space, scenic, and aesthetic features and values of the Ranch
for the beneﬁt of the people of and visitors to Wyoming either created a charitable
trust, or constituted a restricted charitable gift, the administration of which is also
governed by charitable trust principles.
a. Legal Principles
Charitable gifts made to government entities and charitable organizations
can be either restricted or unrestricted. See Nancy A. McLaughlin, In Defense of
Conservation Easements: A Response to the End of Perpetuity, 9 Wyo. L. Rev. 1, 2
(2009). An unrestricted charitable gift is a contribution of money or property
that the donor makes without attaching any conditions on its use by the recipient
entity or organization. Id. An entity or organization in receipt of an unrestricted
charitable gift is free to use that gift as it sees ﬁt in accomplishing its general
public or charitable mission. Id. A restricted charitable gift, on the other hand, is
a contribution of money or property that the donor makes to a government entity
or charitable organization to be used for a speciﬁc charitable purpose and often
according to carefully negotiated terms. Id. at 2–3.
In many cases, restricted charitable gifts are characterized as “charitable trusts”
even in the absence of the use of the word “trust” or “trustee” in the instrument of
conveyance. See, e.g., In re Estate of Heil v. Nevada, 210 Cal. App. 3d 1503, 1511
***

Plaintiff ’s Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 19–41, Salzburg
v. Dowd, Civ. No. CV-2008-0079 (Aug. 12, 2009) (on ﬁle with the Wyoming Law Review).
Editor’s Note: Plaintiff ’s Memorandum appears here with its original footnotes. All nonconforming
citations and any omissions, corrections, and substitutions in this excerpt using standard punctuation
appeared in the original with the exception of the ﬁrst bracketed substitution identifying the Board of
County Commissioners of Johnson County, Wyoming. Omissions by the author are indicated by * * * *.
Emphasis appearing in the original and superscripts have been changed to comply with our journal’s style
requirements.
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(Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (bequest to State of Nevada for the purpose of preservation
of wild horses in Nevada created a charitable trust); Chattowah Open Land Trust,
Inc. v. Jones, 636 S.E.2d 523, 524–26 (Ga. 2006) (devise of decedent’s home and
surrounding acreage to a charitable organization for the purpose of maintaining
the property in perpetuity exclusively for conservation purposes within the
meaning of Internal Revenue Code § 170(h) “unambiguously created a charitable
trust,” and decedent’s failure to use the terms “trust” and “trustee” did not alter the
outcome because the strict use of those terms is not required to establish a trust);
In re Village of Mount Prospect, 522 N.E.2d 122, 125–26 (Ill. App. 1988) (land
dedicated to Village “for public purposes” was held to create an express charitable
trust and could not be sold without court approval in a cy pres proceeding); City
of Salem v. Attorney Gen., 183 N.E.2d 859, 862 (Mass. 1962) (devise of land
to city to be used “forever as public grounds” established a trust); State v. Rand,
366 A.2d. 183, 186, 196 (Me. 1976) (gift of land to city to be “forever held and
maintained . . . as a public park” created a charitable trust); Bankers Trust Co. v.
New York Women’s League for Animals, 23 N.J. Super. 170, 182 (1952) (bequest
to charitable organization to be used to purchase a rural farm for the care of
animals created a trust); Abel v. Girard Trust Co., 73 A.2d 682, 684 (Pa. 1950) (“A
charitable trust is created by deed where there appears in the deed an intention
that the transferee shall hold the land subject to the equitable duty to use the land
for a charitable purpose.”).
It is well-settled that no magical incantation, such as use of the
word ‘trust’ or ‘trustee,’ is required to create a trust. Indeed,
the settlor need not even understand precisely what a trust is.
All that is required to create a trust is an intention to create
a ﬁduciary relationship in which one person holds a property
interest subject to an equitable obligation to keep or use that
interest for the beneﬁt of another.
McLaughlin, 9 Wyo. L. Rev. 1, 20–21.
The Restatement (Third) of Trusts (2003) treats restricted charitable gifts as
charitable trusts, providing in cmt. a of § 28:
An outright devisee [sic] or donation to a . . . charitable institution,
expressly or impliedly to be used for its general purposes, is
charitable but does not create a trust . . . A disposition to such
an institution for a speciﬁc purpose, however, such as to support
medical research, perhaps on a particular disease, or to establish
a scholarship fund in a certain ﬁeld of study, creates a charitable
trust of which the institution is the trustee. . . .
Moreover, even in those cases in which a restricted charitable gift is
not characterized as a technical “trust,” the substantive rules governing the
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administration of charitable trusts, including the doctrine of cy pres, nonetheless
apply. See, e.g., Estate of Vallery v. St. Luke’s Cmty. Found. Inc., 883 P.2d 24, 28
(Colo. Ct. App. 1994) (bequest for a speciﬁed charitable purpose constituted a
“restricted gift” as opposed to a trust, but doctrine of cy pres applied); Blumenthal
v. White, 683 A.2d 410, 412–13 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996) (gift of land to a city with
instructions that land be used as a public park and not transferred did not create a
trust “in strict sense,” but “it may be so regarded,” and city held land as a “quasitrustee”); Lancaster v. City of Columbus, 333 F. Supp. 1012, 1024 (N.D. Miss.
1971) (“It is settled state law that lands taken and held by a municipality as a gift
for a speciﬁc purpose are subject to the law of trusts, and any use inconsistent
with that intended by the dedicator constitutes a breach of trust.”); School Dist.
No. 70, Red Willow County v. Wood, 13 N.W.2d 153, 156 (Neb. 1944) (“a gift to
a charitable corporation [for a particular purpose] is equivalent to a bequest upon
a charitable trust and will ordinarily be governed by the same rules”); St. Joseph’s
Hosp. v. Bennett, 22 N.E.2d 305, 308 (N.Y. 1939) (while no trust arises “in a
technical sense,” a charitable corporation “may not . . . receive a gift made for one
purpose and use it for another, unless the court applying the cy pres doctrine so
commands”).
The Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 348, cmt f. (1959) explains:
Property may be devoted to charitable purposes not only by
transferring it to individual trustees to hold it for such purposes,
but also by transferring it to a charitable corporation. . . .
Where property is given to a charitable corporation, particularly
where restrictions are imposed by the donor, it is sometimes
said by the courts that a charitable trust is created and that
the corporation is a trustee. It is sometimes said, however,
that a charitable trust is not created. This is a mere matter of
terminology. . . .
Ordinarily the principles and rules applicable to charitable trusts
are applicable to charitable corporations. . . .
The doctrine of cy pres (see § 399) is applicable to gifts to
charitable corporations as well as to gifts to individual trustees
for charitable purposes.
Regardless of whether they are characterized as charitable trusts, restricted
charitable gifts are enforceable by the state attorney general. See, e.g., Lefkowitz v.
Lebensfeld, 417 N.Y.S.2d 715 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979) (noting “the never disturbed
equitable doctrine that although gifts to a charitable organization do not create a
trust in the technical sense, where a purpose is stated a trust will be implied, and
the disposition enforced by the attorney general, pursuant to his duty to effectuate

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol10/iss1/3

32

McLaughlin and Weeks: Hicks v. Dowd, Conservation Easements, and the Charitable Trust D

CONSERVATION EASEMENTS AND TRUST

2010

105

the donor’s wishes”); Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 348, Reporter’s Note. cmt
f. (“Where restricted gifts are made to charitable corporations, the restrictions
are enforceable at the suit of the Attorney General”); McLaughlin, 9 Wyo. L.
Rev. 1, 6–7, n. 12 (quoting Austin W. Scott & William F. Fratcher, The Law
of Trusts § 348.1 (4th Ed. 1989) (“Certainly many of the principles applicable
to charitable trusts are applicable to charitable corporations. In both cases the
Attorney General can maintain a suit to prevent a diversion of the property to
purposes other than those for which it was given; and in both cases the doctrine
of cy pres is applicable.”)).
Wyoming law is in accord with these authorities. In Buffalo Bill Memorial
Ass’n, the Supreme Court of Wyoming held that fee title to land that had been
donated to a charitable association to be used for a speciﬁc charitable purpose
– to perpetuate the memory of Buffalo Bill – could not be transferred by the
association without authorization of a court of equity. Buffalo Bill Memorial Ass’n,
196 P.2d 369, 382 (Wyo. 1948). The court explained:
Grants made to a charitable corporation may, of course, be of various
kinds. They may be absolute or, on the other hand, proper terms,
conditions and directions may be annexed thereto. In the latter case,
the terms, conditions and directions annexed must be carried out. . . .
....
[W]ithout particularly characterizing the grants involved in this
case at this place, we are here dealing with a charitable trust, or the
ordinary rules relating thereto should be applied. . . .
....
[C]ounsel completely failed to recognize that the rules of a charitable
trust are applicable herein.
Buffalo Bill Memorial Ass’n, 196 P.2d at 377, 383 (emphasis added).
Charitable trust principles also apply to charitable gifts to municipal
corporations. See Rayor v. City of Cheyenne, 178 P.2d 115, 117 (Wyo. 1947) (“If a
dedication of property for public use is by a private party, not even the legislature
can authorize property thus dedicated to be used for any other purpose, since that
would violate the contract between the dedicator and the public”); McQuillin,
The Law of Municipal Corporations § 47:17 (“A gift to a municipal corporation
for a charitable purpose cannot, after the municipality accepts it, be renounced
or conveyed away so as to defeat the charity”); Id. § 28:25 (“when the trust is
accepted, the municipal corporation assumes the same burdens and is subject
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to the same regulations that pertain to other trustees. The duty to administer
the donation or charitable fund agreeably to the expressed wish of the donor or
testator will be enforced in equity, and, where circumstances warrant such action,
the municipal corporation may be removed or replaced as trustee.”).
“The theory underlying the power of the attorney general to enforce gifts
for a stated purpose is that a donor who attaches conditions to his gift has a
right to have his intention enforced.” Carl J. Herzog Found., Inc. v. Univ. of
Bridgeport, 699 A.2d 995, 998 (Conn. 1997). See also St. Joseph’s Hosp. 22 N.E.2d
at 307 (“Nothing in authority, statute or public policy has been brought to
our attention which prevents a testator from leaving his money to a charitable
corporation and having his clearly expressed intention enforced.”); Holt v. Coll. of
Osteopathic Physicians and Surgeons, 394 P.2d 932, 935 (Cal. 1964) (“In addition
to the general public interest…there is the interest of donors who have directed
that their contributions be used for certain charitable purposes. Although the
public in general may beneﬁt from any number of charitable purposes, charitable
contributions must be used only for the purposes for which they were received in
trust.”).
The Wyoming Supreme Court has similarly recognized the rights of charitable
donors. See First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Wyo. v. Brimmer, 504 P.2d 1367, 1371
(Wyo. 1973) (“The clearly expressed intention of the settlor should be zealously
guarded by the courts, particularly when the [charitable] trust instrument reveals
a careful and painstaking expression of the use and purposes to which the settlor’s
ﬁnancial accumulations shall be devoted.”); Bentley v. Whitney Beneﬁts, 281 P.
188, 190 (Wyo. 1929) (“The provisions of instruments creating charitable trusts
are favorably regarded by the courts, and are generally construed with the utmost
liberality in order to carry out the laudable purpose of the donor.”).
b. Application of Above Legal Principles to Lowham’s Charitable
Donation of the Conservation Easement to the Board
****
Lowham clearly did not donate the conservation easement to the Board to be
used for the Board’s general purposes. Rather, Lowham donated the conservation
easement as a charitable gift to the Board to be used for a very speciﬁc charitable
purpose—the preservation and protection in perpetuity of the natural, agricultural,
ecological, wildlife habitat, open space, scenic and aesthetic features and values of
the Ranch for the beneﬁt of the people of and visitors to Wyoming. Accordingly
the conservation easement constitutes a restricted charitable gift and, pursuant
to Buffalo Bill Memorial Ass’n and the other authorities referenced above “we are
here dealing with a charitable trust, or the ordinary rules relating thereto should be
applied. . . .” (emphasis added). Buffalo Bill Memorial Ass’n, 196 P.2d at 377.
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The conservation easement deed reveals a particularly careful and painstaking
expression of the use and purposes to which Lowham intended the gift would be
devoted, and “[t]he clearly expressed intention of the [donor] should be zealously
guarded by the courts. . . .” First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. Brimmer, 504 P.2d at
1371. As explained in one of the leading cases in this area:
[E]quity will afford protection to a donor to a charitable
corporation in that the Attorney-General may maintain a suit
to compel the property to be held for the charitable purpose for
which it was given. . . .
....
No authority has been brought to our attention that a gift to
a charitable corporation with the express direction that it be
applied to a speciﬁc corporate purpose in a speciﬁc manner may
be accepted by the corporation, and then used for a different
corporate purpose in a different manner. . . . [A] charitable
corporation . . . may not . . . receive a gift made for one purpose and
use it for another, unless the court applying the cy pres doctrine so
commands.
St. Joseph’s Hosp. 22 N.E.2d at 306–07, 308 (emphasis added). In addition, as
explained above, these same charitable trust rules also apply to charitable gifts
made to municipal corporations. See Rayor, 178 P.2d at 117; McQuillin, The Law
of Municipal Corporations §§ 28:25; 47:17.
c. The Uniform Trust Code, the Uniform Conservation Easement
Act, the Restatement (Third) of Property, and Federal Tax Law
Further Support the Application of Charitable Trust Rules to the
Conservation Easement
Wyoming adopted the Uniform Trust Code (UTC) effective July 1, 2003.
See WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 4-10-101 through 4-10-1103. The drafters of the UTC
speciﬁcally addressed conservation easements in their comments to § 414, which
provides a special set of rules for the modiﬁcation and termination of “uneconomic
trusts,” but also provides that the section does not apply to conservation easements:
Even though not accompanied by the usual trappings of a
trust, the creation and transfer of an easement for conservation
or preservation will frequently create a charitable trust. The
organization to whom the easement was conveyed will be
deemed to be acting as trustee of what will ostensibly appear to
be a contractual or property arrangement. Because of the ﬁduciary
obligation imposed, the termination or substantial modiﬁcation of
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the easement by the “trustee” could constitute a breach of trust. The
drafters of the Uniform Trust Code concluded that easements for
conservation or preservation are sufﬁciently different from the
typical cash and securities found in small trusts that they should
be excluded from [§ 414], and subsection (d) so provides. Most
creators of such easements, it was surmised, would prefer that the
easement be continued unchanged even if the easement, and hence
the trust, has a relatively low market value.
Uniform Trust Code § 414 cmt. (2005) (emphasis added); WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 4-10-415(c). The comments by the drafters of a uniform law adopted by
Wyoming are particularly persuasive authority in light of the Legislature’s
explicitly declared goal of promoting uniformity with other jurisdictions that
have also adopted the uniform law. See WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 4-10-1101 (“In
applying and construing this act [the UTC], consideration shall be given to the
need to promote uniformity of the law with respect to its subject matter among
the states that enact it.”); 8-1-103(a)(vii) (“Any uniform act shall be interpreted
and construed to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those
states which enact it[.]”).
Wyoming has also adopted the Uniform Conservation Easement Act (UCEA),
effective July 1, 20052. See WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-1-201 through 34-1-207.
That Act states that:
Except as otherwise provided in this article, a conservation
easement may be created, conveyed, recorded, assigned, released,
modiﬁed, terminated or otherwise altered or affected in the same
manner as other easements.
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34-1-202(a). It also provides, however, that the Wyoming
UCEA “shall not affect the power of a court to modify or terminate a conservation
easement in accordance with the principles of law and equity.” WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 34-1-203(b). In the original comments to the UCEA, the drafters explained
that “the Act leaves intact the existing case and statue law of adopting states as
it relates to the modiﬁcation and termination of easements and the enforcement
of charitable trusts,” and “independently of the Act, the Attorney General could
have standing [to enforce a conservation easement] in his capacity as supervisor
of charitable trusts.” Uniform Conservation Easement Act § 3 cmt. (1982)
(Emphasis added).

2
Like the UTC, the Wyoming UCEA promotes uniformity of application and construction:
“This article [the UCEA] shall be applied and construed to effectuate its general purpose to make
uniform the laws with respect to the subject of the article among the states enacting it.” WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 34-1-206.
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In 2007, the drafters amended the comments to the UCEA to include
further discussion of conservation easements as enforceable under charitable trust
principles:
The [UCEA] does not directly address the application of
charitable trust principles to conservation easements because:
(i) the [UCEA] has the relatively narrow purpose of sweeping
away certain common law impediments that might otherwise
undermine a conservation easement’s validity, and researching
the law relating to charitable trusts and how such law would
apply to conservation easements in each state was beyond the
scope of the drafting committee’s charge, and (ii) the [UCEA]
is intended to be placed in the real property law of adopting
states and states generally would not permit charitable trust
law to be addressed in the real property provisions of their state
codes. However, because conservation easements are conveyed
to governmental bodies and charitable organizations to be held
and enforced for a speciﬁc public or charitable purpose – i.e., the
protection of the land encumbered by the easement for one or more
conservation or preservation purposes – the existing case and statute
law of adopting states as it relates to the enforcement of charitable
trusts should apply to conservation easements. This was recognized
by the drafters of the Uniform Trust Code, approved by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
in 2000.
....
The [UCEA] leaves intact the existing case and statute law
of adopting states as it relates to the modiﬁcation and termination
of easements and the enforcement of charitable trusts. Thus,
while Section 2(a) provides that a conservation easement
may be modiﬁed or terminated “in the same manner as other
easements,” the governmental body or charitable organization
holding a conservation easement, in its capacity as trustee, may be
prohibited from agreeing to terminate the easement (or modify it in
contravention of its purpose) without ﬁrst obtaining court approval
in a cy pres proceeding.
Uniform Conservation Easement Act § 3 cmt. (amended 2007) (emphasis added).
In 2000, the American Law Institute published the Restatement (Third)
Property: Servitudes, which recommends that, in lieu of the traditional real
property law doctrine of changed conditions, the modiﬁcation and termination of
conservation easements held by governmental bodies or charitable organizations
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should be governed by a special set of rules based on the charitable trust doctrine
of cy pres. In their commentary, the drafters of the Restatement explained:
Because of the public interests involved, these servitudes
[conservation easements] are afforded more stringent protection
than privately held conservation servitudes. . . .
There is a strong public interest in conservation and preservation
servitudes. . . .
The rules stated in this section are designed to safeguard the
public interest and investment in conservation servitudes to the
extent possible, while assuring that the land may be released
from the burden of the servitude if it becomes impossible for it
to serve a conservation or preservation purpose. . . .
....
If the particular purpose for which the servitude was created can
no longer be accomplished, but the servitude is adaptable for
other conservation or preservation purposes, the servitude should
be continued for those other purposes unless the document that
created the servitude provides otherwise.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 7.11 cmts. a and b (2000).
Finally, federal tax law also contemplates that charitable trust principles will
apply to tax-deductible conservation easements. 26 U.S.C. § 170(h) sets forth the
criteria governing tax beneﬁts for those who donate conservation easements. See
also C.F.R. § 1.170A-14 (interpreting IRC § 170(h)). To be eligible for a federal
charitable income tax deduction, a landowner donating a conservation easement
must satisfy the following requirements (among others):
(i) The conservation easement must be conveyed as a
charitable gift to a government entity or charitable organization
to be used for a speciﬁc charitable purpose—the protection
of the particular land encumbered by the easement for one
or more of the conservation purposes enumerated in the
Internal Revenue Code “in perpetuity.” See generally 26 U.S.C.
§ 170(h); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14.
(ii) The conservation easement must be expressly transferable
only to another government entity or charitable organization
that agrees to continue to enforce the easement. See Treas. Reg.
§ 1.170A-14(c)(2).
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(iii) The conservation easement must be extinguishable by
its holder only in a judicial proceeding, upon a ﬁnding that
the continued use of the encumbered land for conservation
purposes has become “impossible or impractical,” and
with the payment of a share of the proceeds from the
subsequent sale or development of the land to the holder to
be used for similar conservation purposes. See Treas. Reg.
§ 1.170A-14(g)(6).
These requirements ensure that every tax-deductible conservation easement
will be conveyed in the form of a restricted charitable gift, thereby triggering the
application of charitable trust principles under state law, including the requirement
that the easement be terminated only in the context of a judicial proceeding.
The conservation easement Lowham donated as a charitable gift to the Board
was drafted to comply with federal tax law requirements. It was donated as a
charitable gift to a government entity for the speciﬁc purpose of protecting certain
conservation features and values of the Ranch in perpetuity for the beneﬁt of the
people of and visitors to Wyoming (i.e, it was donated as a restricted charitable
gift). [Appendix A, Deed, p. 1, ¶ 2; p. 2, ¶ 1] It required that any transfer of
the easement had to be to a “qualiﬁed organization” that agreed to enforce the
easement. [Appendix A, Deed, p. 8, ¶ 9(a)]. It also speciﬁcally required that the
easement could be terminated only in a judicial proceeding, upon a ﬁnding that
continuation of the easement had become impossible, and with a payment of
a share of the proceeds to the holder as mandated by the Treasury Regulations.
[Appendix A, Deed, p. 8, ¶ 9(b)].
In sum, pursuant to well-settled state law governing charitable gifts made
to government entities and charitable organizations for speciﬁed charitable
purposes, and consistent with the recommendation of the American Law
Institute in the Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes, the intent of the
drafters of the Uniform Trust Code and the Uniform Conservation Easement
Act (both adopted in Wyoming), and federal tax law requirements, Lowham’s
donation of the conservation easement to the Board either created a charitable
trust, or constituted a restricted charitable gift, the administration of which is also
governed by charitable trust principles.
2. The Board Breached its Fiduciary Duties by Failing to Obtain Judicial
Approval in a Cy Pres Proceeding for the Transfer and Termination of
the Conservation Easement
As explained above, Lowham’s charitable gift of the conservation easement to
the Board either created a charitable trust, or constituted a restricted charitable
gift, the administration of which is also governed by charitable trust principles. By
accepting the charitable gift of the conservation easement, the Board assumed the
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ﬁduciary obligations of a trustee. See Buffalo Bill Memorial Ass’n 196 P.2d at 377
(“we are here dealing with a charitable trust, or the ordinary rules relating thereto
should be applied. . . .”); McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 28:25
(“when the trust is accepted, the municipal corporation assumes the same burdens
and is subject to the same regulations that pertain to other trustees. The duty to
administer the donation or charitable fund agreeably to the expressed wish of the
donor or testator will be enforced in equity. . . .”).
Pursuant to the common law, termination of a restricted charitable gift or
charitable trust or modiﬁcation of its purpose requires judicial approval pursuant
to the doctrine of cy pres. See Jackson v. Phillips, 96 Mass. 539 (1867) (Applying
cy pres to a charitable trust created to promote abolition of slavery; in light of
Thirteenth Amendment, court amended trust to provide aid to former slaves); St.
Joseph’s Hosp. 22 N.E.2d at 306–07, 308 (“[a] charitable corporation . . . may not
. . . receive a gift made for one purpose and use it for another, unless the court
applying the cy pres doctrine so commands”); Restatement (Second) of Trusts
§ 348, cmt f. (1959) (“The doctrine of cy pres . . . is applicable to gifts to charitable
corporations as well as to gifts to individual trustees for charitable purposes”). The
Wyoming Supreme Court has described this rule thusly:
In 2 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, § 435, the author states:
‘In the absence of special provisions in the trust
instrument, the trustees have no power of their own
motion to decide that it has become impossible or
inexpedient to carry out the trust as originally planned
and then to substitute another scheme. If the trustees
feel that an emergency of this type has arisen, they
should bring the situation to the attention of the court
and ask for instructions.’
That is said in connection with the doctrine of cy pres. . . .
That terms means ‘as nearly as possible.’ ‘Roughly speaking,’ says
Bogert, supra, § 431, ‘it is the principle that equity will make
speciﬁc a general charitable intent of a settlor, and will, when an
original speciﬁc intent becomes impossible or impracticable of
fulﬁllment, substitute another plan of administration which is
believed to approach the original scheme as closely as possible. It
is the theory that equity has the power to mould the charitable
trust to meet emergencies.’ . . . It is sometimes referred to as the
doctrine of Approximation.
Buffalo Bill Memorial Ass’n, 196 P.2d at 378 (citations omitted); see also
McLaughlin, In Defense of Conservation Easements, 9 Wyo. L. Rev. at 52–53.
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The conservation easement deed incorporates the doctrine of cy pres as the
procedure required to terminate the easement:
The Grantor wishes to express again its intent that this Easement be
maintained in perpetuity for the purposes expressed herein. However,
if due to unforeseeable circumstances a ﬁnal binding non-appealable
judicial determination is made that continuation of this Easement
is impossible, or if such determination renders the continuation
of the Easement impossible (e.g. pursuant to a condemnation
proceeding), and if a judicial determination is made that the
Easement cannot be so reformed as to accomplish substantial
compliance with the purposes of this Easement, then Grantor
and Grantee, with the approval of the Court, may agree to transfer
their respective interests in the Ranch, provided the Grantee shall be
entitled to such proceeds from the transfer as provided for in Treasury
3
regulation section 1.170A-14(g)(6)(ii) . . . [.] (Emphasis added).
[Appendix A, Deed, p. 9, ¶ 9(b)]
****
The conservation easement deed also permits the Board to voluntarily transfer
the easement only to another “qualiﬁed organization” that agrees to continue to
enforce the easement.
Grantee shall have the right to transfer or assign any and all rights
and responsibilities accruing unto it by this Easement, provided
that the assignee is an entity acceptable to Grantor, and that,
at the time of such transfer of [sic] assignment the transferee is
a “qualiﬁed organization,” within the meaning of § 170(h) of
the Code, and provided that such transfer or assignment shall
be conditioned on the transferee or assignee complying with or
enforcing the conservation purposes which this Easement intends to
accomplish.
[Appendix A, Deed, p. 8, ¶ 9(a)]
By accepting the charitable gift of the conservation easement, the Board
became bound by the easement’s terms. See Am. Nat. Bank of Cheyenne, Wyo. v.
Miller, 899 P.2d 1337, 1339 (Wyo. 1995) (“A fundamental duty of a trustee is to
carry out the terms of the trust”); Buffalo Bill Memorial Ass’n, 196 P.2d at 377 (the

3

The Treasury Regulations require that the holder receive a certain percentage of the proceeds
upon extinguishment and use such proceeds “in a manner consistent with the conservation purposes
of the original contribution.” See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(6).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2010

41

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 10 [2010], No. 1, Art. 3

114

WYOMING LAW REVIEW

Vol. 10

terms, conditions and directions annexed to a charitable gift must be carried out);
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 4-10-801 (“Upon acceptance of a trusteeship, the trustee shall
administer the trust . . . in accordance with its terms and purposes . . .”).
The Board thus had “no power of their own motion to decide that it has
become impossible or inexpedient to carry out the trust as originally planned and
then to substitute another scheme.” Buffalo Bill Memorial Ass’n, 196 P.2d at 378
(quoting 2 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 435). Rather, in order to transfer the
conservation easement to private parties – the Dowds – and thereby terminate the
easement, the Board was obligated to seek judicial approval in a cy pres proceeding
pursuant to both state law governing the administration of charitable gifts made
for speciﬁc purposes and the express terms of the conservation easement deed.
The Board completely ignored the legal duties and obligations it assumed upon
accepting the charitable gift of the conservation easement and its conveyance of
the one-acre parcel and the conservation easement to the Dowds was therefore
void. See Buffalo Bill Memorial Ass’n, 196 P.2d at 378–82 (Transfer of trust
property in contravention of trust terms and purpose and without authorization
of a court of equity is void.).
****
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